



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Longley Lane

20 Houses

for: Wythenshawe Community Housing Group

version A: 14th December 2021

URN: 2021/0555/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Longley Lane, Sharston

2021/0555/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor Design Changes Advised

This development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' in order to identify any opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. Overall, the proposed scheme has been found acceptable in principle, but further consideration of some minor aspects is recommended as stated in section 3.3 of this report in order to gain our full support for this development at planning stage. These include:-

- *Definition of private front gardens*
- *Relationship with neighbouring premises*

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Michael Craig', with a stylized flourish at the end.

Michael Craig DipLD CMLI

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1 Visual Audit

The site, shown red on plan, is located in the Sharston area of south Manchester, about 1km south of Northenden district centre. The neighbourhood is mainly residential, containing a mix of private and social provision. There are various pockets of greenspace located within the housing estates.

To the south of Longley Lane the character changes with commercial / light industrial uses predominant. The southern boundary of the site adjoins a day nursery and adult learning centre. A recreation ground lies to the north with goal posts located close to the site.

The site is currently vacant, containing the buildings and structures of its former use. Existing fences and hedges run along the northern and eastern sides of the site, providing a reasonably effective barrier from the adjacent public open space, however the boundary fencing appears to have been breached to allow recovery of balls. A substantial oak tree occupies a prominent location within the site.



Access road off Longley Lane




Hedges and fencing at west of site



North side of site showing boundary with recreation ground



Recreation ground to north of site



Footpath along north western boundary



Existing buildings on the site on left of picture

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st November 2020 to 31st October 2021.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
12	<5	32	83	85	5	<5	10	<5	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is 47% below the average rate of crime for the Manchester District. Less serious wounding, theft and criminal damage have been the highest recorded offence types taking place in the local area. Whist theft is high the local area, it is concentrated to the junction of Longley Lane and Harling Road where a fuelling station is located. Offenders have fuelled vehicles, and made off without payment. Violence in the local area has been concentrated to the north of the proposed site where a residential estate has been located. Malicious communications and public order offences have mostly been recorded, with offences often resulting from a domestic dispute or incident between known associates. Vehicles and dwellings have mostly been targeted during the commissioning of a criminal damage offence. Offenders have targeted glazing, using objects to smash the glass, as well as using implements to damage body work of vehicles.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure windows and doors (mostly to the rear of the property) using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to BS PAS 24 or equivalent security standard (see section 4) - these doors are very difficult to force open. Front doors (& garage doors) should be visible to neighbouring properties and from the street, rather than set within recesses or on more secluded elevations. Offenders will be less inclined to target properties where their actions can be witnessed.

- 2.2.2 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors (mostly to the front of the property).

Possible Solution - All ground floor windows should include key-operated locks and opening restrictors. Unauthorised access to the rear of the dwellings should be deterred by the erection of robust boundaries, and the avoidance of open pedestrian routes to the rear of the properties. Side and rear gardens should be enclosed with appropriately high and robust fencing with lockable gates so that rear windows are only accessible to residents. Secluded passageways to the sides and rear of properties should be avoided. Front doors should include a split spindle mechanism which locks on closure and can only be opened from outside with a key. Front gardens should include defined boundaries to discourage offenders from approaching the doors.

2.3 Risk Factors





The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes

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- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
 - Unauthorised access to private spaces
 - Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester, Greater Manchester and England & Wales




The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2020.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **58% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **27% lower** than Greater Manchester and **4% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **34% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **3% higher** than Greater Manchester and **11% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **20% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **16% higher** than Greater Manchester and **73% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **78% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **59% lower** than Greater Manchester and **29% lower** than England & Wales.

2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





2.5.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Thursday through to Saturday, during the afternoon (12pm – 3pm). Offenders often target properties during the day when residents are likely to be away from the property attending work and educational facilities, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for the offender(s). Offenders have also targeted properties during the late evening and early hours of the morning, when it is dark and there is less footfall, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be identified.

2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements (mostly lock snapping) in order to gain access to the property.
- In cases where entry point is unknown, offenders are likely to have targeted insecure windows and doors.
- Posing as a legitimate tradesperson, gaining unlawful access to the property and removing items from within.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks during the middle of the week (Wednesday – Friday) during the evening and into the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target vehicles during this time as they are often out of sight of the vehicle owner for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

All data used within the report is correct, give or take 8%, due to updates with our I.T systems

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development comprises demolition of the existing buildings on the site and construction of 20 semi-detached houses.
- 3.1.2 Access to the site will be as existing, via the service road off Longley Lane, which also provides access to neighbouring community facilities.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The overall layout is in the form a relatively short cul-de-sac with a single access / egress point, which has been shown to pose the lowest level of burglary risk for residents.
- 3.2.2 Car parking provision for the new houses is located within the curtilage of the property.
- 3.2.3 Houses will have windows of routinely-occupied rooms on the front elevation (at ground floor level) which helps to maximise informal surveillance opportunities of the adjacent public realm.
- 3.2.4 The principal entrance to all the new houses is located on the front elevation and should be clearly apparent on approaching the dwellings. Front doors should not be recessed by more than 600mm so that a potential offender on the doorstep can be easily seen from the street and neighbouring properties.
- 3.2.5 The development does not include any gable-end walls directly abutting streets or other public space.
- 3.2.6 Front and rear garden spaces in private gardens will be separated using 1.8m high fencing and gates – this should be aligned as closed as possible to the front of the dwellings.
- 3.2.7 Space is available within the enclosed rear gardens of each house to accommodate waste bins, avoiding the need for free-standing bin stores in front of the houses where they could provide potential hiding places and targets for criminal damage.
- 3.2.8 The area of public open space around the existing oak tree will benefit from some overlooking by new houses opposite. It could be improved if the properties 1 & 19 included windows of routinely occupied rooms facing the open space.
- 3.2.9 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the buildings and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Further Recommendations to Improve Security

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Definition of front garden boundaries. Front garden spaces should be well-defined using low walls and / or fencing, hedging and changes in surface materials, in order to identify the space as private and discourage unauthorised access to property / parked vehicles and short-cutting across corner plots. Also, the boundaries alongside plots 1 & 19 should clearly separate the private gardens from the area of public open space around the oak tree.
- 3.3.2 Evaluation of existing boundaries of the site. In places where the existing boundary treatment is required to provide a secure barrier around the site, the condition of the fencing should be reviewed to ensure that it can provide a consistent level of security. Any sections of deficient fencing should be replaced with a robust weld-mesh panel fencing system. Any additional fencing should not provide an aid to climbing or otherwise undermine the integrity of existing boundaries. Particular attention should be given to detailing wall / railing combinations, and the junctions of the different styles and heights of boundary treatment to avoid inadvertently creating a step or ladder feature which could compromise the integrity of the site boundary, and possibly require retrofitting of unsightly security features.

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- 3.3.3 Interface with nursery and learning centre. Sight lines and any CCTV / boundary treatments around the nursery building should be evaluated to ensure that the layout of buildings and fencing for the proposed development does not compromise its security, and that intruders can still be detected.
 - 3.3.4 Fencing / railings or walls and gates adjacent to public or communal space that is intended to create a secure boundary should be a minimum height of 2.1m.
 - 3.3.5 Effective lighting should be included to allow users to feel secure in the hours of darkness. Location of lamp columns should take account of obstructions to vision such as any proposed or existing vegetation.
 - 3.3.6 Interface with recreation ground to north of site. The adjacent grass area of public open space is used for ball games, with goal posts / nets located close to the site boundary. This can create issues for residents, as players gaining entry to retrieve balls from rear gardens can compromise the fencing, providing easier access for other intruders. It would be preferable to realign the football pitch to reduce the potential for balls landing in back gardens or install higher fencing along this boundary. The developer should liaise with the city council to address this matter.
 - 3.3.7 Communal space maintenance. The robust management of such spaces is essential as poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour.
 - 3.3.8 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed in section 4 are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in users.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- Front and rear doors to houses, including doors to cottage flats, must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- French / double doors and folding or sliding patio doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- Front doors to houses should have fixed external handles or split spindles, meaning access is only possible with a key.
- Front doors should have either fixed sidelights or door viewers.
- Chain limiters are recommended but not generally essential.
- Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.

4.2 Windows

- Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- Ground floor and easily-accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed / lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

- Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, (including any internal doors in to garages and, PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.
- If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.

4.5 Boundary Treatment

- Rear boundaries should generally be 1800mm high and of close boarded timber construction. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure.
- Rear boundaries that are adjacent to public space should have a masonry (or other hardwearing) base, with timber fence above to a total height of 2100mm. It is recommended that the top 300mm consist of trellis structure.
- Sub-divisional rear boundaries may be as low as 1500mm.
- The fronts of properties should be demarcated by low boundaries such as planting and / or railings to an approximate height of 1000mm.
- Any low boundaries that adjoin high boundaries should have transition panels / sections to prevent the low boundary being used as a climbing aid over the higher.
- Gates in to the rear curtilage of dwellings should be in keeping with the height of adjacent boundary treatments and incorporate either:
 - A pad lockable bolt to the midpoint of the internal face, or
 - A key operable deadlock
- If residents are likely to use these gates when leaving their property, then the gates must be lockable from both sides.

4.6 Landscaping

- In vulnerable locations such as entrances, parking areas and footpaths, low planting should not exceed 1000mm in height, and tree canopies should fall no lower than 2m from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better, make a rational choice of routes and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- Loose surface materials in the publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.
- There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.

4.7 Lighting

- External lighting must be provided to the front and rear of dwellings, operated by photoelectric cell / daylight sensor (manual override is also permissible). PIR security lighting is not recommended for these locations and should not be employed unless advised.

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- Lighting to pedestrian routes through the site should be in accordance with BS 5489. Lighting to public areas (footpaths and roads) should be evenly distributed and not create areas of shadowing or pooling. Any low level lighting should be positioned to avoid creating glare.
 - Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow / orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.8 Other

- Any meter cupboards requiring reading should be located to the fronts of properties only, not in the private areas. Internal smart meters are acceptable.
- Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- There have been incidents involving metal theft from the area. Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and metal pipework and wiring should not be visible.
- Any garden sheds must be securely fixed to a concrete foundation and the shed door fitted with a certificated 'Sold Secure' Silver Standard padlock, hasp and staple (coach bolted through the shed structure). The shed door should be at least 44mm thick so that the door can be locked into the doorframe using either a mortise deadlock or mortise sash lock certificated to BS 3621: 2007.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter and graffiti removal to ensure that the site remains in good repair.
 - Regular inspection, service and repair to communal security features (lighting, fencing & gates)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees to ensure that sight lines are maintained and coverage of lighting and any CCTV is not impaired.
- 5.1.2 Ensure that the site management is for which the site was designed remains in place, such as 24 hour concierge / security patrols.
- 5.1.3 Information regarding security features (such as specifications of windows / doors and systems performance) should be conveyed to the ultimate owners or managers of the site to ensure that any future replacements continue to provide the same level of security and maintain any security accreditation for the development.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

Appendix

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
04/11/2021	Arcus Consulting	CIS instruction received
08/11/2021	Arcus Consulting	Commission confirmed / fee agreed
07/12/2021	Wythenshawe Community Housing Group	Payment received
09/12/2021	N/A	Site visit
10/12/2021	Arcus Consulting	Additional Information Provided
14/12/2021	Arcus Consulting	CIS version A issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
P-01	Proposed Site Plan	12/10/21	
F-02	House Type One	24/05/21	E
F-03	House Type Two	24/05/21	E
F-04	House Type Three - Plots 19 and 20	17/09/21	A
P-06	Fencing	10/12/21	A
	D&A statement (draft)		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door-set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a

6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk