



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

102-104 Waterloo Road

Retail (19,502sqm)

For: **NN Holdings (NW) Ltd**

Version A: **04/03/2022**

Ref: **2009/1275/CIS/01**

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

102-104 Waterloo Road

2009/1275/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported – Minor security additions required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, namely:

- Secure cycle & bin store provision
- External lighting
- Site wide CCTV
- Access control to central courtyard for tenants only
- Ground floor external material protection against graffiti
- Additional windows to gables
- Management & maintenance regime

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Section 4 of this report.

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The proposed site is located off the busy Waterloo Road, which connects Strangeways into Cheetham Hill and Manchester City centre.

The site is located on the boundary between Strangeways and Cheetham Hill district of central Manchester, approx. 2km from the city centre.

The area is synonymous with small scale retail units, restaurants, food outlets and textile and clothing warehouse units.

The perception of the area is one of neglect, anti-social behaviour and an unsafe area; this is reflected in the crime stats within this document.

The streets contain high levels of litter and there is evidence of 'fly-tipping' around the perimeter of the proposed site.

Neighbouring sites include textile manufacturing warehouses and restaurants/food outlets.

The area on the opposite side of Waterloo Road is dominated by residential estates.



1 – View towards the site from Waterloo Road.



2 – View east up Broughton St.



3 – Business adjacent to the site on Waterloo Road.



4 – Business adjacent to the site on Waterloo Road



7 – Business adjacent to the site on Broughton St.



6 – View east up Broughton St.



5 – Boundary treatment with adjacent business on Broughton St.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st February 2021 to 31st January 2022.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
21	40	35	216	56	17	6	29	24	<5

- 2.1.1 The overall crime rate in the local area is average for Manchester. The proposed site is located within the Cheetham Hill area of Manchester, on the outskirts of the city centre, which mostly consists of retail and industrial units to the south and residential estates located to the north. Less serious wounding, non-domestic burglary and vehicle crime are the highest recorded crime types taking place within the local area.
- 2.1.2 Less serious wounding has taken place throughout the local area, with a hotspot of offences occurring to the south of the proposed site, around Bury New Road and Waterloo Road junction as well as around Fairy Lane and surrounding streets. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded less serious woundings in the area, with the majority of assaults occurring within dwelling and residential streets with domestic disputes most commonly reported. Public order offences have mostly taken place between unknown associates at places of work or public transport stops.
- 2.1.3 Non-domestic burglary in the local area is high, with the majority of offences occurring to the east of the proposed site, along Broughton Street and Derby Street. Offenders have targeted offices and retail outlets, forcing open shutters and smashing glazing in order to gain entry. Offenders are targeting properties in the late evening and early hours of the morning, when the premises is closed and there are less people present in the area.
- 2.1.4 Vehicle crime in the local area is high, a hotspot of offences taking place to the north of the proposed site, around Fairy Lane and Waterloo Road. The north of the proposed site consists of residential street and educational facilities. Vehicles within these areas are usually left for long periods of time, unsupervised, creating low risk opportunities for offenders.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 The breaking of windows/glass doors to gain entry to premises.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Sections 5.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries, lighting and CCTV can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

- 2.2.2 Forcing open of shutters by levering rolling shutters open, breaking locks off of shutters or using vehicles to ram shutters and damage them, allowing access.

Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 5.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc) have been scrutinised by professionals. Avoid locating shutters in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed. Ensure that parked vehicles and stored materials do not obscure sight lines.

- 2.2.3 Offenders posed as customers to shoplift or target business property (clothes & food) or personal property (mobile phones).

Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to interior design, It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. The internal layout of the premises can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities.

-
- 2.2.4 The majority of vehicles are targeted when parked on the street, despite the number of car parks in the area.

Possible Solution – The layout of the development should be designed to accommodate the likely demand for car parking space in order to cater for their visitors. Formal parking spaces for should be located within the defined boundary of the site, with entry restricted to unit tenants. Any other parking spaces should be located where they can be easily overlooked from windows of routinely occupied rooms in adjacent premises. Any arrangement for off-site car parking should utilise sites approved under the 'Park Mark' safer parking scheme.




2.3 Risk Factors - Retail

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Commercial burglary
- Cash robbery
- Unauthorised access to private spaces/Tailgating
- Shoplifting
- Employee theft
- Theft of customer / staff property
- Criminal damage to property

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.





2.4.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Wednesday. During the day the risk of burglary at retail premises increases in the early hours of the morning (12am – 6am). Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed and the streets are quiet. Offenders perceive the risk of being witnessed or apprehended at its lowest.

2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been the occurred most frequently:

- Smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain entry to premises.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and tailgating / exploitation insecure doors to gain access to staff only areas.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily force and implements to gain entry.
- Opening secure doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain entry.

2.5 Theft Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.5.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of theft from retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Friday and Saturday. During the day the risk of theft at retail premises peaks in the late morning and into the evening (10:30am – 8pm). Small, personal items are being targeted, mostly mobile phones, purses and bags.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Tuesday during the afternoon (2pm – 5pm). Offenders often target vehicles during the afternoon as they are often parked for long periods of time, out of sight of the owner, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposal seeks to develop land currently used as a small commercial business with surface car parking. The proposed development will provide 3 retail units with office and storage space over an additional 2 floors. The scheme has been arranged so the retail frontages face surrounding streets.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposal will see the development of land which is currently under used and provides surface grade car parking which is not controlled.
- 3.2.2 The site will offer greater use across the day and provide increased activity and natural surveillance.
- 3.2.3 Security measures carefully incorporated into the building design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime. The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Given the high levels of vehicle crime and theft of cycles in the local area, access to the proposed vehicle and cycle parking areas must be robustly secured, controlled and maintained, in order to prevent unauthorised access. The vehicular entrance to the car park should be fitted with a high speed automatic vehicular gate/s, operated by key fob/proximity reader with no automatic egress (i.e. access control both 'in' and 'out') so that criminals cannot gain access to the area, attack the vehicles and escape (see Section 4.5). The location of the gate/s should not create a publicly accessible sheltered recess within the building line that may foster loitering/gathering, nuisance and anti-social behaviour etc. Any pedestrian gates into the foyer should be self-closing and should also be fob-in and fob-out, for the use of unit workers only. The cycle store and refuse stores should also be enclosed and fitted with security-certified, fob-controlled doors to prevent unauthorised access/theft.
- 3.3.2 The car parking area and pedestrian routes should be illuminated to a high level and in accordance with BS 5489 which should be considered as the minimum standard. A variety of lighting sources should be used to illuminate the environment rather than reliance on one type of lighting which can lead to pooling/shadowing.
- 3.3.3 Car parking bays should be clearly marked and it should be clear (i.e. with signage) which spaces are for designated users of the retail units. Tenants should be allocated specific parking bays to reduce the potential for conflict.
- 3.3.4 Review of boundaries. The condition of the boundary fencing should be reviewed to ensure that it can provide a consistent level of security to the site. Any sections of deficient fencing should be replaced with a robust fencing system. Any new boundary fencing should be 2.4m high minimum (see section 4.9). This should include the division between the site and the neighbouring premises.
- 3.3.5 Access to the sides and rear of the units should be controlled using fence lines aligned with the front or side elevations of the buildings, to create an obvious division between the communal frontage of the site and the more secluded areas behind the buildings, where an intruder could operate without fear of detection. It is recommended the installation of low level knee railings / hoops should be implemented to create an obvious divide between site and units across the scheme.
- 3.3.6 Protection of buildings and fence lines from vehicular movements. Perimeter fencing and buildings should be protected from accidental vehicle damage by installation of wheel stops in parking bays or installation of crash barriers, bollards or kerbing. Areas for vehicle movement within the site should be

well-defined and distinguished from parking areas and pedestrian routes – parking bays must be demarcated to clearly indicate where parking is permitted / not permitted.

- 3.3.7 Entrance positions. The entrances to the units should be readily apparent on approaching them. Footpath routes should lead directly to the entrances, and landscaped areas around the building should be well-defined to avoid creating ambiguity of purpose.
- 3.3.8 Consideration to be given to the location of external visitor cycle hoops. Bicycles left at the hoop location for long periods of time will become targets for theft and/or damage. Therefore, Cycle hoops should be located in a position where they can be viewed by the centre users and/or staff. Safe cycle storage will encourage and promote greener transport methods to the development and help to reduce crime levels.
- 3.3.9 Cycle parking. Any provision intended for staff should be within a secured enclosure, preferably within the buildings - external cycle stores should be within the secure boundary and covered by the site CCTV system and SBD-approved cycle stands.
- 3.3.10 Given the prolific high levels of graffiti within and around the site, it is important that external cladding materials at ground floor are sealed protected and supports the removal of graffiti.
- 3.3.11 Given the development sites location and the current level of illegal 'fly-tipping' around the vicinity it is important that all boundaries are covered under a site wide CCTV system. A management plan should be developed and submitted, incorporating regular removal and cleaning the pavements of litter and graffiti. Removal of litter on a weekly basis will challenge the 'Broken window' theory whereby it becomes the norm & acceptable that litter & graffiti is allowed to happen. Removal of these issues help create a sense of pride and community within the area in-turn helping to create an atmosphere of order and lawfulness, thereby preventing more serious crimes from happening.
- 3.3.12 It is essential that all of the physical security measures listed below are incorporated into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in staff and visitors.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ All external doors (single and double leaf) must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. All escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ Any shutters or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ The doors/frames to internal offices / rooms etc. should be robust / solid-core (minimum 44mm thick) and capable of being secured when unoccupied. Staff should be able to store their belongings in a secure area while at work.
- ☐ Garage or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.

4.2 Shutters

- ☐ Where grilles or shutters are required for additional protection the minimum certification required is:
 - LPS 1175: Issue 7 Security Rating 1
 - STS 202: Issue 3, Burglary Rating 1

4.3 Windows

- ☐ All windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.4 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as **P4A** under **EN 356**. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.5 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover all buildings on the site, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room.

4.6 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:
 - All external doors where regular staff access is required.
 - Doors separating internal zones / lobbies
 - Any internal doors to obvious high risk or controlled areas (e.g. storage / server / locker rooms)

4.7 Cash office and store room

- ☐ Any cash office should have solid masonry walls, no adjacent false/suspended ceilings and a security-certified door-set. Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times.

4.8 Wall Construction

- ☐ Wall construction should be of a robust nature enough to withstand physical attack through the material.
- ☐ Where a lightweight wall construction is being considered a reinforced lining such as welded steel mesh will need to be incorporated. Alternatively, there should be a block work wall or material of similar strength (e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind or within any cladding to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the building fabric itself is not vulnerable to attack.

4.9 Roof construction

- ☐ Lightweight roofing systems must be certified to a minimum of:
 - LPS 1175: issue 5 or above, SR1
 - STS 202: Issue 1 or above, BR1

4.10 Boundaries

- ☐ The whole of the site should be secured with rigid-panel welded-wire mesh fencing (with no mid-rails that would aid climbing) and gates, minimum height of 2.4m. Care should be taken to ensure that panels are fixed securely to the posts and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the



panels/gates. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures / locking points to gates should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding / protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The fencing/gates should also be located away from any other climbing aids, such as lighting columns, trees, junction boxes etc.

- ☐ The site boundary treatments should be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, the ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary.
- ☐ Where exposed, the perimeter fencing should be protected on the inner side from potential damage from large vehicles, using crash barriers or rails to deflect any encroachment and maintain a secure boundary. The condition of fencing along the perimeter of the site should be regularly inspected for damage/attack.

4.11 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Lighting to vehicle circulation areas, service yards and car parks should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.
- ☐ Internal lighting should be operated by detection devices which will automatically switch lights on with movement activity in each room.

4.12 Car parking

- ☐ Lighting to all parking areas should be in accordance with BS 5489, with an average lux level 20 and a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ The surface of the car park should be even tarmac. The integrity of the surface treatment should be maintained to ensure that there is no loose material that can be used to commit crime.
- ☐ Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated to avoid confusion or conflict, with pedestrian routes / directions clearly signed.
- ☐ Where feasible, a one-way system should be implemented to reduce the likelihood of collisions and conflicts. Traffic calming measures should be incorporated to limit the speed of vehicles within the site.

4.13 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.

- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: **Entrances to site, external areas all around the new building and ancillary facilities, external doors including emergency egresses / hatches, access-controlled doors & cycle parking areas.**

4.14 Other

- ☐ Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Any cycle stores should be secure, lockable enclosures.
- ☐ Any bin stores should be secure, lockable, and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.
- ☐ Directions and signage. Visitors to the site should be clearly directed to appropriate entrances and exits. Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people to and through the buildings, but also to deter unauthorised access to restricted areas. Lack of orientation can provide legitimacy to an intruder.
- ☐ Staff lockers should be provided, and in a location where there is a high level of activity and surveillance, so that staff can safely store personal items during the working day.
- ☐ Extraction systems. The premises should be designed with efficient ventilation / extraction systems capable of reducing temperatures and providing sufficient ventilation without the need for staff or customers to open service doors (to the side or rear of the premises) that could undermine the integrity of other security arrangements.
- ☐ Places that may be vulnerable to graffiti such as expanses of wall and doors should be formed of graffiti-resistant materials or have a protective coating applied at the outset in order to facilitate rapid removal (e.g. 'easy on' – see www.urbanhygiene.com for details).
- ☐ Smoking areas
 - Fixed litter disposal units or ashtrays should be provided for the disposal of cigarette butts.
 - Smoking areas should be well lit to allow safe use and access.
 - Smoking shelters should be secured outside the opening hours of premises use to prevent any ability to congregate within the area after operational hours. These areas should also be covered by CCTV and be designed and located to allow natural surveillance by staff.
 - Smoking shelters should ideally be located away from built structures so as not to act as a climbing aid or form insecure recesses.
- ☐ All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work. Ideally, there should also be a secure cash office – which should have solid masonry walls (with no adjacent false/suspended ceilings), a door-set certified to BS PAS 24 and a safe providing adequate capacity and overnight cover. The correct size and category of safe should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance needs. Consideration should also be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind the counter area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in the till during busy periods. Internal access doors/frames to all other staff-only areas, storage/cellar rooms etc.

should also be solid-core (min. 44mm thick) and fitted with either auditable access controls (i.e. proximity readers or swipe cards) or secured with key operated locks (carried by staff only if required for duties and accounted for at all times) to secure them when unoccupied. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.



The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as ‘the broken window theory’. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:

- Litter removal
- Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
- Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

5 Construction

- 5.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the ‘Considerate Constructors Scheme’, who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 5.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

6 Useful References

6.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 6.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
07/02/22	Client	Application submitted
08/02/22	Client	Client confirmed CIS report
15/02/22	DfS	Invoice issued
08/03/22	DfS	Site visit
09/03/22	DfS	CIS complete

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
PL-01	Location Plan	Jun 21	
PL-02	Existing Site Plan	Jun 21	
PL-03	Existing Elevations	Jun 21	
PL-04	Ground Plan	Jun 21	
PL-05	Upper Floor Plans	Jun 21	
PL-06	Elevations 1	Jun 21	
PL-07	Elevations 2	Jun 21	
	Planning Statement		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk