




CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

37 Peter Street

Drinking Establishment (581sq m)

FOR: Clearbell UK Strategic Limited Partnership

Greater Manchester Police

VERSION A: 12th January 2022

designforsecurity

REFERENCE: 2021/0631/CIS/01

37 Peter Street

2021/0631/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The proposed scheme has been found generally acceptable, with a series of recommendations made in section 3.3, if these recommendations are implemented we would be supportive of a planning application.



Patrick Babb

Consultant

e: patrick.babb@designforsecurity.org

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
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1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the city centre area of Manchester, close to the Town Hall and Albert Square.

The proposed development site is the lower-ground floor of the Freetrade Exchange building (37 Peter Street), which is positioned on the junction of Peter Street and Southmill Street, with Bootle Street to the rear. The main entrance to the building is located on the front elevation on Peter Street and to the rear there is the shuttered entrance to a car lift.

The site lies in close proximity to a number of similar uses to the proposed, including Brew Dog adjacent.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st December 2020 and 30th November 2021.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
18	107	194	977	733	72	20	195	26	107

- 2.1.1 The volume of crime in the local area is extremely high – with the most prevalent types of crime being violence, theft, vehicle crime and criminal damage. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 The majority of the violence has occurred around the Deansgate and Quay Street area, where there is a high concentration of licensed premises. Incidents peak in the evening/during early hours of the morning, with a higher volume of incidents typically experienced between Friday and Sunday – when more people tend to visit the city centre and attend licensed premises, often for longer periods and consuming more alcohol, leading to conflicts. Thefts are also prevalent within this area, where by offenders have targeted insecure bags and mobile phones stored on backs of chairs and tabletops.
- 2.1.3 Vehicle crime is high, with theft from a vehicle and criminal damage to a vehicle most commonly reported. Offenders have targeted vehicles within private car parks and on street parking. Glazing has been smashed in order to gain access and cause damage, as well as vehicle parts removed (vehicle registration plates and catalytic converters) and scratched/ damaged body work of the vehicle.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Customers posing as legitimate customers, gaining access to staff only areas

Possible Solution - There should be a secure area for staff to leave their belongings while at work and access to all staff areas should be restricted with auditable access controls.

- 2.2.2 Theft of personal property from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables

Possible Solution - A particular issue in drinking establishments within the Manchester city centre area is the theft of personal effects; handbag and mobile phone theft is a particular issue. Consideration should be given to fixing 'Chelsea Clips' (see image), Grippa clips, or simple hooks to the underside of tables to allow customers to secure bags or jackets to the table while keeping it in view; a more secure option than, for example, table tops or back of chairs, where belongings can be liable to theft.



The internal layout of the premises can also help deter theft by promoting surveillance and creating an uncluttered, environment, avoiding pinch points or areas of concealment. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.

2.2.3 Doors have been forced open with tools and bodily pressure

Possible Solution – All external doors should be certified to the relevant security standards (see section 4).

2.2.4 Glazing in windows has been smashed

Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible glazing should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see section 4 for more details).


2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery / wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.3.1 Non-Domestic Burglary (Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against licenced premises, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.




2.3.2 **Day / Time Range:** In Manchester, the risk of burglary at licensed premises between Monday and Wednesday and is lowest on Friday. The risk of burglary is highest in the early hours of the morning. Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed and the areas/streets where they are typical found are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive the risk of being detected or identified as low.

2.3.3 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure doors and windows – mostly fire doors located to the side and rear of the property are targeted – using bodily pressure and implements to gain access.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and exploiting insecure doors/ tailgating staff into restricted areas, taking property belonging to employees and the business.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily pressure and implements to access the doors and windows located below.
- Broken glazing to windows and doors – located mostly to the front of the property, with glass in doors highly targeted- using bricks or implements located around the scene.

2.4 Theft (Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis


The data below relates to thefts within/against licenced premises, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 -2019..



- 2.4.1 **Day / Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester licensed premises peaks over the weekend. On these days, many premises within the city centre area experience higher levels of attendance than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunity for offenders to commit theft is greater. The risk of theft peaks late at night and into the early morning. This reflects the times when licensed premises are at their busiest and therefore the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses / wallets, cash and phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items - usually stolen from table tops, from bags hung on chairs/stored under tables or via pickpocketing and distraction methods. Theft of property belonging to staff is also common, with offenders posing as legitimate customers to gain access to unauthorised areas.

2.5 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.5.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Saturday and Sunday during the afternoon (12pm – 4:30pm) and evening (6:30pm – 11pm). Offenders have mostly targeted vehicles using private car parking and on street parking facilities. Vehicles are often left unsupervised for long periods of time in areas where footfall is reduced, creating a perceived low risk opportunities for offenders.

All data used within the report is correct, give or take 8%, due to updates with our I.T systems

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is a change of use of the lower ground floor from offices to Sui Generis bar use.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposed development will generate activity in the building in the evening and at night when it might otherwise be vacant.
- 3.2.2 The proposed use is in keeping with the uses in the city centre area.
- 3.2.3 The main entrance to the building is positioned on Peter Street where it is well overlooked. This entrance only serves the lower ground floor area and no other areas of the building, allowing the unit to be easily secured when not in use.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Access to staff/storage areas should be restricted to staff. It is recommended that doors in to areas restricted to staff operate on an access control system (i.e. fob or swipe card) or that they are lockable by key, a door closer should be installed to ensure the door locks as staff enter/leave this area. Signage should indicate which areas are only for members of staff.
- 3.3.2 The entrance to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising. Customers entering/leaving the premises should be easily observed by staff.
- 3.3.3 A smoking area should be defined and clearly demarcated and a procedure for allowing smokers to re-enter the premises should be set out in the operating procedures for the venue. The smoking area should not be positioned too close to the corner of the building where it could impede pedestrian flow.
- 3.3.4 Theft of personal property is a common occurrence in licensed premises in the city centre. It is recommended that 'Chelsea Clips' or simple hooks are fitted to the underside of tables to allow customers to secure bags or jackets to the table while keeping it in view; a more secure option than, for example, table tops or back of chairs, where belongings can be liable to theft.
- 3.3.5 Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) behind any till/bar area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods. Cash should be stored securely in a safe within a secure back office.
- 3.3.6 The proposed opening hours should be in line with similar premises in the local area.
- 3.3.7 Any alterations to the shopfront should be in accordance with Secured by Design standards.
- 3.3.8 Casual access to the rear of the bars/service counters should be restricted (e.g. with a lockable hatch that cannot be easily scaled) to prevent unauthorised access.
- 3.3.9 Licensed premises are often the scene of violent disorder. A comprehensive CCTV system should be installed so that any incidents will be recorded. The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. As a minimum the following areas should be subject to coverage:
- Bar/service areas
 - Internal/external seating areas
 - Main entrance
 - Toilet lobby
 - Cloakroom

- 3.3.10 Restaurants and bars in the Manchester city centre have frequently been targeted by burglars. It is highly recommended that the premises should be covered with a monitored alarm (with response).

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation. The recommendations typically apply to new build elements or replacements of existing external fittings.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External doorsets should be compliant with, and certified to, BS PAS 24 or LPS 1175 SR2. All of these doors should be self-closing and self-locking.

4.2 Windows & Shutters

- ☐ Where feasible, any ground level, opening windows should be certificated to LPS1175 or BS PAS 24, fitted with opening restrictors and with key operated locks.
- ☐ Curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Any security shutters or grilles must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required).

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All accessible glazing (i.e. below a height of 2000mm from external ground level) must incorporate an internal pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining external pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ Any louvres at ground floor level to plant areas/refuge stores should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed or damaged. Security-certified louvred doorsets are also available if required (see <https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search> for SBD approved suppliers).

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored intruder alarm system should be installed. Alarms should have contacts on all external doors or shutters, and PIR in rooms with windows. The alarm should include a signal terminating at the security control room/patrol team.

4.5 Access control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:
 - External doors
 - Staff only areas
 - Plant areas and areas restricted to maintenance staff
- ☐ Lockers should be provided for staff to securely store their property while working.

4.6 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk-to-dawn lighting, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, and producing 'white' light, should be installed to all external doors and the building elevation.

4.7 CCTV

- ☐ A CCTV camera system should be installed. Cameras should be capable of monitoring all building elevations - with particular emphasis on external doors (cameras should be able to observe people coming and going), and the entrance lobbies.
- ☐ Recording equipment should be located within a secure room or images may be recorded off-site at a suitable monitoring facility.
- ☐ CCTV monitoring screens should be located at the service areas and back-of-house.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 Active continuous management and maintenance of the premises can reduce the likelihood of crime and disorder occurring. An operating/maintenance plan should be created to promote good management of the premises, this plan should focus on issues such as:
 - Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Any cash management within the premises;
 - Any cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
 - Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
 - Details of staff security training;
 - Location and management of any smoking areas;
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras etc;
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
 - Refuse collection arrangements.
- 5.1.2 There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.
- 5.1.3 The opening hours of the premises should be consistent with other such premises in the local area and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses. Service of drinks should end approximately 30 minutes before the premises closes, in order to aid effective dispersal of customers.
- 5.1.4 All high value equipment (e.g. computers, flat screen monitors/televisions etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 5.1.5 Toilets can give rise to problems and the following issues should be considered:
 - Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
 - Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
 - Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.

-
- Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
 - Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
 - Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.
- 5.1.6 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the premises, but also to deter unauthorised access to back-of-house/staff-only areas.
- Refuse collection arrangements should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods. Servicing activities should also not require any service doors to remain open and unattended for prolonged periods.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
MLA.AR(SK)100	Location Plan		
	Pre-Application Enquiry Report	Nov 21	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		