



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

A development of 7 industrial/warehouse units with a combined floorspace of 8,465m², and associated parking and landscaping

AT Land at 19-21 Elizabeth Street, Cheetham, Manchester

FOR: Kier Trade City Limited

VERSION A: 14.02.22

2021/0523/CIS/02

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development supported

Industrial and commercial premises in urban areas where there is little supervision by security personnel, by local residents or the passing public tend to attract a degree of criminal activity, including: breaking and entering, theft of plant and materials from external storage areas, and criminal damage. A number of businesses in this neighbourhood trade from premises that lack well-designed, integrated security measures, and have often resorted to crude additions to buildings in order to frustrate criminals but such measures are unsightly and compound the sense that security is a significant issue. The number of recorded crimes affecting business premises is high which warrants the development being built to a very secure standard, with security an integral element of the design.

Whilst supporting the development, I do have some concerns, particularly the absence of a security lodge and adequacy of perimeter fencing. Consequently, I have made several recommendations to improve the design of the development from a crime prevention perspective and the main ones are summarised as follows:

- Employing a round-the-clock security presence
- Erecting a security lodge at the entrance to the development
- Ensure the design, height and material used in the boundary fencing minimises the risk or damage or penetration by offenders and add defensive planting to supplement the fencing.
- Security rated external doors, roller shutters, window frames and laminate glazing should be used when constructing the buildings.
- Use of access controls to regulate movements into and through each unit, where appropriate
- Installing appropriate lighting, CCTV and intruder alarm systems
- Providing weatherproof motorcycle/cycle parking in a secure locations
- Limiting business hours of premises in the western part of the site to respect the amenity of residents of the neighbouring apartments

At the planning application stage, Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will make representations to Manchester Planning to require adherence to the security recommendations set out in the report and inclusion of a condition requiring the completed development to achieve Secured by Design, SBD, accreditation. Should the recommendations included in this report be adopted, I have every confidence that the scheme will achieve the award and the condition met.

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Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The development site and its surroundings are shown on the plan and photographs below. The 4.68 acre site, edged in red on the plan, is situated about 1 mile north of Manchester city centre in the Cheetham ward. This part of Cheetham is dominated by industrial, warehousing and retail premises. Access is gained from the site's north side, off Elizabeth Street. Immediately west of the access there is an L-shaped business unit that is occupied by a fashion and furniture fabrics wholesaler. Elizabeth House, a large, warehouse, office and showroom building, is located to the east of the access. Cheetham Hill Retail Park is situated on the north side of Elizabeth Street, opposite the site entrance. It comprises a terrace of large units and a large car park which is also accessed from Elizabeth Street. Wholesale businesses dominate the numerous properties around the periphery of the site with premises facing Bent Street to the east, and Raynesway and Bradstone Road to the south. A residential development comprising a series of apartment buildings and associated secure car park adjoins the north-western corner of the site. Jamia Tul Muntazir, an Islam school and community centre, adjoins the apartment complex west of the site.





Vacant warehouse buildings on Elizabeth Street and the site access further west



The entrance to the site on Bridcam Street is secured with concrete blocks



Looking across the cleared site from north to south



The north-eastern boundary is defined by a line of very tall trees



A fabric wholesaler occupies the unit west of the site entrance on Elizabeth Street



Retail units opposite the site on the Cheetham Hill Retail Park

The site itself comprises an irregularly shaped area of largely vacant land and two, single-storey, warehouse units, which are also vacant and in a state of disrepair. The warehouse units adjoin Elizabeth Street at the northern edge of the site. The yard was once used as an auto salvage yard but has remained unused for at least ten years; all that remains is a large area of hardstanding, much of which has been colonised by simple vegetation. Very tall, mature trees, I assume planted many years ago to screen previous activities at the site, line the eastern and western boundaries. The sole means of access into the site is via Bridcam Street, a very short, poorly surfaced street, the whole of which falls within the site boundary. Bridcam Street also allows access to the rear service area of the adjacent fabric wholesalers. Whilst vehicle access into the site has been restricted by the placement of large concrete blocks, it remains accessible on foot. The perimeter of the site is defined by a number of different types of fencing including steel palisade, concrete post and panel and timber fencing. There are several parts of the boundary where the fencing has been breached leaving the site easily accessed by trespassers. Fly-tipping appears to be an issue at the site.

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

2.1 Crime in the neighbourhood

The data below relates to crimes recorded between 1st January and 31st December 2021, committed within 500m of the site.

General crime

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft (including shoplifting)	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
13	45	56	301	133	15	7	33	21	<5

2.1.1 There were 653 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood around the development site during the period analysed. This is much higher than the average for a typical neighbourhood within Manchester.

2.1.2 The most common crimes recorded (10% or more) were:

- the use, or threat, of violence - 47%
- theft (including shoplifting) - 20%.
- vehicle crime, i.e., theft of, theft from and criminal damage to a vehicle - 8%
- burglary - 9%.

2.1.3 The streets where 30 or more crimes were recorded were:

- Cheetham Hill Road - 236 dominated by crimes at Manchester Fort)
- Elizabeth Street - 43
- Stanley Street - 30



2.1.4 The most common places for a crime to be committed in the neighbourhood were the Manchester Fort Shopping Park, industrial and warehouse premises south of the Fort, and the residential streets north of Queens Road and Elizabeth Street. Public order and shoplifting were the most commonly recorded crimes at the Fort. In the parts of the neighbourhood dominated by industrial and warehouse premises, burglary and crimes involving the use or threat of violence dominate. Crimes involving the use or threat of violence were common in the residential streets in the northern part of the area analysed.

2.1.5 In the immediate vicinity of the site, shoplifting and theft dominate, specifically at the Cheetham Hill Retail Park, where just under half of the Elizabeth Street crimes occurred. Other offences included: criminal damage, burglary of houses and business premises and vehicle related crimes.

Crime at industrial and warehouse premises

2.1.6 Of the 45 burglaries at business premises, industrial and warehouse premises were targeted in 90% of cases; the remainder were retail premises. Theft, crimes involving the use or threat of violence, vehicle-related crime and criminal damage were less common crimes affecting industrial and warehouse premises. There were two crimes recorded at office premises but none at industrial premises. A reflection of the lack of such premises in the neighbourhood.

Vehicle Crime



- 2.1.7 **Day/Time Range:** There were 54 recorded crimes in the neighbourhood around the development site during the period analysed, two thirds of which involved theft from a vehicle, the remaining crimes involved taking the vehicle without consent. The risk of vehicle crime is greatest on a Monday and Thursday, and in the middle of the afternoon.



2.2 Crime at industrial & warehouse premises in Manchester

The data below relates to crimes at industrial and warehouse premises recorded in Manchester in 2018.


- 2.2.1 There were 219 crimes recorded at industrial and warehouse premises in the City of Manchester during the period analysed. The most commonly recorded crime was burglary (58% of the total), followed by theft (13%), crimes involving the use or threat of violence (11%), and vehicle-related crimes (10%).

Burglary

- 2.2.2 There were 128 incidents of burglary across the city in the period analysed.





- 2.2.3 **Day/Time Range:** The risk remains high through the week with the greatest risk on Sunday and Monday. The most common times for burglary to be committed are in the late evening and the early hours of the morning.



- 2.2.4 **Point of Entry:** Forcing shutters was the most common method of gaining entry during a burglary. Doors were forced in around a quarter of all burglaries carried out, and in one third of incidents. Offenders entered premises via a window on 10 occasions, whilst the walls and a roof of premises were breached 18 times. There were 6 incidents that involved offenders gaining entry without using force before committing burglary, suggesting doors or windows were not secure or the offender was in a building for legitimate reasons before committing the crime.

Theft

- 2.2.5 There were 29 incidents of theft (including bicycle theft and robbery) across the city in the period analysed.



Day/Time Range: The risk of theft is small but is a little more common on a Saturday and the most common time for theft to occur is around mid-day and later in the afternoon. The two more common occurrences of theft are theft of personal property, from within buildings (e.g.

2.3 Modus operandi used in burglary, theft and damage at business premises in Manchester and measures to reduce risk

2.3.1 Ram-raiding walls, gates and shutters and penetrating walls and the roof with tools

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing walls, roofs shutters and gates:

- security-certified roller shutters and fencing/gates (to LPS 1175) should be used wherever possible - sliding gates tend to be more secure than hinged gates;
- steel frame buildings clad in profiled metal sheet should include a 2000mm high brick or blockwork base or a suitably robust inner layer of attack resistant material, e.g. expanded metal panels;
- roofs should be high enough that they are not easily accessible, comprise of a security-rated roofing system or include a sandwich of materials which makes them difficult to penetrate; and,
- anti-ram bollards or vehicle barriers (ideally, that meet the PAS 68 standard) should be installed in front of gates and shutters.

2.3.2 Shutters have been forced upwards by offenders

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing shutters:

- security-certified roller shutters (to LPS 1175) should be used wherever possible;
- where size limits the availability of certified shutters, intruder alarms, CCTV and lighting should be deployed to increase the security of these larger openings; and,
- anti-ram bollards or barriers should be deployed to help secure the most vulnerable shutters.

2.3.3 Doors have been forced open with tools and locks have been smashed to gain entry

To minimise the risk of offenders forcing doors:

- all external doors should be certified to PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 sr2 standard – security rated doors are very difficult to force open;
- external doors should be placed where they can be readily observed by staff or monitored readily by CCTV and fitted with alarm contacts; and,
- the deployment of visible security patrols, appropriately high boundary fencing to control access to a site, CCTV and lighting can also deter offenders.

2.3.4 Entering a building via unsecured doors and windows.

To minimise the risk of offenders committing rime by entering via unsecured windows or doors

- external doors should be self-closing and lock upon closure; and,
- windows should have opening restrictors and key operated locks fitted:

2.3.5 Glazing in windows and doors has been smashed

To minimise the risk of breaking and entering via windows:

- windows should be avoided on secluded elevations;
- window and glazed doors should be fitted with laminate glass, which, because of its structural properties, is extremely difficult to break and penetrate sufficiently to reach in and open locks; and,
- security shutters or grilles, certified to the LPS 1175 sr2 standard, should be fitted to all windows.

2.3.6 Theft of employee and company property

To minimise the risk of offenders stealing personal property from the business premises:

- tall, robust, fencing and gates (preferably fitted with access controls) should be used to secure the perimeter of a development
- access control systems should be employed to prevent unauthorised personnel from entering buildings - especially offices and staff rooms, where sensitive information, expensive equipment, or staff belongings may be stored;
- if external storage of materials is necessary, consideration should be given to storing valuable plant or machinery in suitably secure containers or hoppers e.g. steel containers
- overt signage should be used to warn against casual entry, referring visitors to appropriately located, visible reception areas; and,
- include space for employees to store personal/valuable items securely e.g. lockers or lockable drawers.

2.3.7 Theft of bicycles

To minimise the risk of offenders stealing bicycles from business premises:

- there should be a limited number of well-supervised, entry points into the site;
- the perimeter should be secured with tall fencing and gates;
- secure, weatherproof cycle parking should be available to employees and visitors;
- cycle parking should be located in well-supervised places; generally, some distance from the site perimeter and, ideally, out of view of passers-by.

2.3.8 Committing criminal damage to buildings and fencing

To minimise the risk of breaking and entering via windows:

- access onto the site outside of business hours should be restricted by robust perimeter fencing and gates, i.e., steel railings or welded wire mesh; and,
- unprotected windows should be avoided on secluded elevations.

2.4 Environmental features that can influence patterns of crime and anti-social behaviour

2.4.1 Features of the physical environment can influence can influence patterns criminal and anti-social behaviour. They affect potential offenders' perceptions about a possible crime site, their evaluations of the circumstances surrounding a potential crime site, and the availability and visibility of one or more witnesses, who might intervene, at or near a site. Offenders may decide whether or not to commit a crime in a location after they determine the following:

- How easy will it be to enter the area?
- How visible, attractive, or vulnerable do targets appear?
- What are the chances of being seen?
- If seen, will the people in the area do something about it?
- Is there a quick, direct route for leaving the location after the crime is committed?

2.4.2 Aspects of the local environment that might help to reduce the risk of crime and disorder at the site are as follows:

- the site is only accessible by vehicle from Elizabeth Street;
- there are parts of the site that share a, reasonably, secure boundary with adjoining business premises, and the apartment complex and Islamic centre, which reduces the prospect of intruders gaining entry or damaging fencing at these parts of the site;

- the Elizabeth Street/Bridcam Street site entrance is visible to the passing public, including Police patrols, where there is the prospect of passers-by witnessing the actions of offenders, which can act as a deterrent to criminal or anti-social activities; and,
- the presence of staff and customers at the various businesses and retailers surrounding the site generate activity and passive surveillance of the site and of the approaches to it.

2.4.3 There are also some features that might facilitate crime and disorder, and these include:

- the site is located in a neighbourhood where crimes that directly affect affecting industrial and business premises are common;
- the site's very large boundary, large parts of which are accessible from public streets or the unsecured service roads and yards of adjacent businesses leaves it vulnerable to breaking and entering or trespass;
- fencing on parts of the site's perimeter has been damaged or removed;
- because the site is somewhat secluded, any offenders who target the development outside of business hours are unlikely to be witnessed;
- the site's proximity to residential streets makes it accessible to local residents, some of whom may be offenders, and with that comes a risk of crime and trespass; and,
- there are indicators of neglect and deterioration in the immediate vicinity of the site, with signs of over-fortification of premises, which is often an indicator that crime is, or has been, a significant issue. Developments where there are signs of physical deterioration and neglect often attracts offenders, who may have a perception that, because of the poor quality of the environment and apparent tolerance of disorder, their actions will go unchallenged.

3 Development Appraisal

3.1 The proposed development

- 3.1.1 The applicant seeks planning consent to construct nine light industry, warehouse and office units with a combined, gross external floorspace of 8,645m².
- 3.1.2 The smallest unit, Unit 1, will have a floorspace of 355m² and the largest, Unit 3, will be 1,994m². Unit 1 will be located adjacent to the site entrance at the junction of Elizabeth Street and Bridcam Street. The remaining units will all be located within the domain of the former breakers yard. They will be set out as a stand-alone unit (Unit 9), in a pair (Units 3 and 4), or a short terrace of four units (Units 4-8).
- 3.1.3 All units will be over 8 metres in height with a pitched roof and constructed using a portal frame, clad in profiled steel sheets. Most units will have accommodation on a first or mezzanine floor. A 4 metre high, service entrance, secured with a roller shutter, will allow vehicles to enter the units. Personnel entrance doors will be positioned on the front elevation of each unit facing the car park/service area. Means of escape doors will be limited to one or two, depending on the unit size, on the side and/or rear elevations. The personnel entrances will be secured with aluminium framed, glazed doors, set within a double-height expanse of curtain walling. Conventional windows will be limited to the first of mezzanine floors; roof lights will allow further light penetration. Escape doors will be fabricated in steel.
- 3.1.4 Externally, each unit will have a small number of car parking spaces, a cycle shelter, and space for servicing.
- 3.1.5 A security gate will be erected at the site entrance, at the southern end of Bridcam Street. The plans indicate a short section of fencing between the proposed security gate and the existing perimeter fencing at the north-eastern edge of the site. The plans do not suggest there will be any additional site perimeter fencing. The tall trees at the western edge of the site and some of those at the north-eastern corner of the site will be retained.

3.2 Positive aspects of the proposal from a crime prevention perspective

- 3.2.1 Investment in new business premises is welcomed, particularly when security is integral to the design of the scheme.
- 3.2.2 The proposals will result in the redevelopment of a vacant site which, if it remains undeveloped, could be prone to acts further criminal acts such as damage to fencing and fly-tipping. A reduction in environmental standards brought about by fly-tipping or vandalism can affect the amenity of nearby residents and businesses. In addition, sites that attract offenders can have a set in motion a chain of events that can result in other property in the locality being targeted.
- 3.2.3 Gates and perimeter fencing will restrict access to Units 2-9.
- 3.2.4 The proposed units are sufficiently tall as to make breaking and entering via the roof lights or roof extremely unlikely.
- 3.2.5 The regular shape of the units makes them easier to monitor by staff during business hours and CCTV when the premises are closed.
- 3.2.6 The units are orientated in such a way as to focus activity and supervision over the access road and car parking.
- 3.2.7 Staff and visitors to Unit 1 will promote activity and supervision of this part of Elizabeth Street.
- 3.2.8 Doors into each unit are limited to a personnel door, means of escape doors and a service shutter.
- 3.2.9 There is a limited amount of external glazing in each unit and windows are confined to the upper floor.
- 3.2.10 Staff and visitor parking will be provided within the site.
- 3.2.11 Places for staff and visitors to park bicycles are included in the proposals.

3.3 Recommendations to improve the security of the development

Given the risks highlighted in section 2.3 and features of the local environment that might facilitate crime or anti-social behaviour in section 2.4, I recommend the following measures are included in the design of the development:

Security lodge

- 3.3.1 In order to prevent access outside of operational hours or control entry at other times, the security of the development would be improved by installing a manned, security lodge, sited adjacent to the vehicle entrance gates.

The buildings

- 3.3.2 The units should have solid brick, or blockwork, walls (external or internal), up to a height of around 2000mm - it is not unusual for offenders to attempt to gain entry by prising open cladding panels, particularly on businesses storing high value, readily disposable, equipment.
- 3.3.3 Security-rated doors, glazed screens and service shutters should be specified, whilst laminate glass should be used in all external glazing, including within external doors.
- 3.3.4 Consider fitting anti-ram bars or bollards in front of the service shutters, and bollards to protect areas of curtain walling from ram raiding attacks.
- 3.3.5 Additionally, glazed doors and ground level glazing should be protected with security-certified, roller shutters when the premises are closed.
- 3.3.6 The entrance door to each unit should be fitted with controls to restrict unauthorised entry. Staff in the office or warehouse/workshop should be able to vet visitors prior to allowing entry via an audio link and a remote door lock release. This is particularly important when there may be only one or two members of staff present.
- 3.3.7 In order to prevent unauthorised access into the warehouse/workshop space from entrance lobbies, the door connecting the lobby to the warehouse/workshop space should be fitted with an electronic or key-code lock.

-
- 3.3.8 The office should contain a safe for cash and valuable documents, and the CCTV recording equipment (if images are recorded on-site). The door to the this room should be certified to BS PAS 24, or be a 44mm solid core door with at least one key-operated, BS certified lock, preferably two, and be self-closing and self-locking.
- 3.3.9 Lockers should be available to staff in each unit to securely store their belongings whilst at work.

Monitored intruder alarm & CCTV

- 3.3.10 A monitored, intruder alarm should be fitted to each unit.
- 3.3.11 A monitored CCTV system should be installed with cameras capable of monitoring the site entrance, service road, and the car and cycle parking. The CCTV system should include a public address system, allowing security staff to issue an audible warning to alert to intruders that they have been detected and a response generated.
- 3.3.12 A CCTV system should be installed in each unit, with cameras capable of monitoring: the external walls and doors; all vehicle and pedestrian movements in and out; and the entrance lobby.

Fencing & gates Unit 1

- 3.3.13 Access to the side and rear of Unit 1 should be restricted by erecting a 2100mm high, weldmesh fence with matching, pedestrian gate.
- 3.3.14 Access to the forecourt of Unit 1 should be restricted to the vehicle access only, which itself should be secured outside of business hours with a steel gate. A 1200mm high steel railing should be erected around the remainder of the forecourt.

Fencing & gates former breakers yard

- 3.3.15 I recommend the entire perimeter of the former breakers yard site be secured with a 3000mm high, steel-mesh, fence, with matching pedestrian and vehicle entrance gates. The gates should be fitted with robust locks and secured at the close of business.
- 3.3.16 Any existing prickly planting around the perimeter of the site should be maintained to enhance security of the perimeter whilst softening the appearance of the fencing.
- 3.3.17 Ideally, perimeter fencing should be erected at the start of the construction contract to preserve the security of plants and materials whilst construction progresses.

Lighting

- 3.3.18 Dusk-to-dawn lighting should be installed to illuminate the entrance to the site, the service road, all external doors and service shutters of each unit, and the car and cycle parking spaces.
- 3.3.19 For pedestrian and vehicle safety, and for security reasons (including to support the CCTV system), low intensity, dusk-to-dawn-lighting should be fitted to the exterior of the buildings and to the car park.

Signage

- 3.3.20 Clear signage should be used to indicate: the name of the development; the names of the companies occupying each unit; that CCTV is in operation: the parking spaces allocated to each unit; and, the location of visitor parking spaces.
- 3.3.21 Bin stores
- 3.3.22 A fire-resistant, bin store should be provided within the service yard of each unit, or a store to serve a group of units.

External area

- 3.3.23 Armco™ barriers should be installed in order to reduce the risk of accidental damage caused by vehicles turning or reversing against the units or the perimeter fencing.
- 3.3.24 The position of any ancillary structures within the service yards, including the bin and cycle stores, should be carefully considered in relation to the following:
- Creating blind spots that might reduce the effectiveness of supervision of the site, the approach to the site along Longstone Road and of the public footpath
 - Creating areas which CCTV cameras cannot monitor

- Reducing the efficiency and effectiveness of site lighting
 - Creating a fire risk
 - Providing a climbing aid that would assist unauthorised exit/entry over boundary fencing.
- 3.3.25 If fuel is stored at any of the units, a fuel management system that allows only authorised users to dispense fuel, as well as only allowing authorised vehicles to be refuelled, should be installed.
- 3.3.26 Plant, machinery and vehicles should be fitted with tracking devices and stored overnight within the units rather than in the car park.

Motorcycle/cycle parking

- 3.3.27 The cycle parking at each unit should be located within a weather-resistant shelter. The shelter should include 'Sheffield' style stands to allow cyclist to secure the wheels and frame, and ground anchors so that motorcyclists are able to secure their bikes.
- 3.3.28 It should be located, where it can be observed more readily by staff in the offices or as staff and customers come and go from the various units.

Residential amenity

- 3.3.29 If excessive noise and disturbance is created by tenants or visitors to premises in the western part of the development, residents may call on the assistance of the Police or Council to intervene. Consequently, in the interests of the amenity, the hours of business should be restricted to those which do not impinge unduly of the quality of life of neighbouring residents of the apartments west of the site. Securing the site outside of business hours will also restrict access to others who might create a nuisance.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Building structure

- ☐ The external walls and sub-dividing walls between units should include block or brickwork wall (or other suitably robust combination of materials) up to a height of 2000mm from ground level.

4.2 Doors

- ☐ All external entrance and means of escape doors should be compliant with, and certified to, LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ The entrance doors, means of escape doors, doors to the office spaces and the doors connecting the lobby to the warehouse/workshop should be capable of self-closing and lock securely upon closure.

4.3 Shutters

- ☐ The service shutters and roller or concertina grilles protecting areas of glazing should all be tested, and certified, to LPS 1175 SR2.

4.4 Window frames

- ☐ Window frames should meet the LPS 1175 or PAS 24 standard, be fitted with key-operated locks and restrictors that limit opening to 100mm.

4.5 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing in the entrance door, curtain walling and all windows should incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass, that is, glass rated as P1A or P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.6 Intruder alarm

- ☐ An intruder alarm should be fitted to each unit and have contacts on all external doors, including the shutters, and PIR detectors in all work spaces.
- ☐ The alarm systems should be monitored, with a response facility (be that an alert to the key holder, or to a security/site management team).

4.7 Access controls

- ☐ In all units, access controls, ideally card/fob operated electronic locks, should be installed to prevent unauthorised access through the entrance door, the lobby to warehouse/workshop door, and the office entrance door.

4.8 Boundary fencing

- ☐ The entire boundary of Units 2-9 boundary should be secured with 3000mm high, welded-wire mesh fencing or railings and similarly styled vehicle and pedestrian gates. Ideally, the fencing should meet the LP1175 standard.
- ☐ The side and rear of Unit 1 should be secured with 2100mm high fencing and a gate fitted with panic hardware that cannot be operated from the 'outer' side of the gate.
- ☐ The forecourt of Unit 1 should be defined with a 1200mm high fence and vehicle gate.
- ☐ Gates and fencing securing the former breakers yard, and the rear of Unit 1, must not include horizontal elements that allow an intruder to scale the fence or gate, and be designed to prevent an offender from crawling under the entry gates fence.

4.9 CCTV

- ☐ Cameras should be capable of monitoring: the entrance gates, service road, each unit and all areas of car and motorcycle/cycle parking.
- ☐ A public address system should be installed to complement the cameras so that camera and alarm monitoring staff can issue a warning to would-be intruders. A mobile response team should be deployed to address any issues arising.

4.10 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk-to-dawn, low intensity, lighting, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor should illuminate: all external doors and shutter openings; all areas of car and cycle parking; the service road and the entrance gates. Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light.

4.11 Car parking

- ☐ Bays should be clearly lined, with visitor bays indicated.

4.12 Motorcycle/cycle store

- ☐ A weather-resistant, cycle shelter should be provided.
- ☐ Securely anchored, Sheffield stands and ground anchors should be installed within the shelter to allow cyclists to secure the wheels and frame to the stand and for motorcyclists to securely park their bikes.

5 Management & Maintenance

- ☐ A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as: securing the site at the close of business; litter removal from the immediate environment around the development; and, repairs to lighting, signage, fencing, gates, access controls, alarms and CCTV.

6 Construction

- ☐ The developer should take appropriate measures to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular movement in and out.
- ☐ The contractor on this scheme should be a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme'.
- ☐ Site security contractors should be Security Industry Authority, SIA, approved.

7 Secured by Design (SBD)

- ☐ Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact	Summary of contact
20.12.21	Nicola Phiri, Fletcher Rae Architects	Request for Crime Impact Statement
05.01.22		Site visited
14.02.22	Oliver Butler, Kier Trade City Ltd. & Nicola Phiri, Fletcher Rae	Report issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and documents:

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
PR1398_SK10	Proposed Site Plan - Option 7	21/09/21	F
21039-FRA-01-XX-DR-A-20- 1004	Unit 1 Elevations	Nov 21	
21039-FRA-04-XX-DR-A-20- 2004	Unit 4-8 Elevations	Nov 21	

In the event of any changes to the scheme, it may be necessary for Design for Security to review the recommendations made.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions	Date
A		14.02.22

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS 7950, 1997

Specification for enhanced security performance of casement and tilt/turn windows.

BS 4873, 2005: Specification for aluminium windows.

BS 7412, 2007: Specification for plastic windows made from PVC-U extruded hollow profiles.

BS 644-1, 2003: Wood windows. Specification for factory assembled windows - various types.

BWF:TWAS: Timber window accreditation scheme.

BS 6510, 2005: Specification for steel windows, sills, window boards & doors.

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door assemblies.

An attack test standard for door sets, which certifies that a particular door, frame, lock and hardware set has withstood a series of physical tests. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing
- b) Performance of hardware
- c) Resistance to static loading
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS01 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

As the title suggests this is an equivalent test standard to PAS 24, incorporating PAS 23 (fitness for purpose), published by Warrington Certification.

STS02 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175. However, STS02 does not extend to cover the higher levels of risk addressed within LPS1175 and the attack methods used differ.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
(Learn more at www.designforsecurity.org/about/cpted)

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk