



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT: PRELIMINARY

FORMER OPENSHAW A.E.U. CLUB, 14 CLUB STREET, MANCHESTER
OUTLINE RESIDENTIAL SCHEME (3 no. APARTMENTS & 23 no. HOUSES)

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: KMM Homes Ltd.

VERSION A: 01/04/2022

REFERENCE: 2022/0105/CIS/01

Former Openshaw A.E.U. Club, 14 Club Street, Manchester

URN: 2022/0105/CIS/01

The 'Crime Impact Statement: Preliminary' Explained

The 'Crime Impact Statement: Preliminary' has been created to accompany outline planning applications where layout is not considered (i.e. the proposal is only at the 'red line' stage). This part of the process will provide your design team with the contextual crime information, and site-specific design considerations needed to develop the layout and appearance of the proposal.

Reserved Matters Applications

Reserved matters applications, where layout is to be considered, will require a full Crime Impact Statement, which will appraise the design and layout of the developed proposals. Please contact us when work commences on the layout of the scheme for us to develop your preliminary report into a full Crime Impact Statement.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

We have no objection to the development of this site for residential use from a security perspective. However, the considerations and general recommendations within this report (see Section 3.2) should be addressed when the design team develop more detailed proposals.

A full CIS report should be prepared when the detailed design of the scheme has progressed and an assessment of the details and specifications can be made. This is most productive well in advance of any future full/reserved matters planning applications, so that any subsequent alterations do not cause delay to the submissions.

Please get in touch with Design for Security if you have any queries regarding the contents of this document, or the security standards referred to therein.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site lies to the north of Club Street, off Ashton Old Road (A635), in the Openshaw area of east Manchester.


It is occupied by the former Openshaw A.E.U. Club – a members only social club comprising of a hard standing parking area (currently secured with herras fencing), a single storey club house and a bowling green enclosed with high walls. The western portion of the site is formed by an area of overgrown scrub vegetation to the rear of the terraced residential properties fronting onto Backwell Street and Burnam Street.

Club Street itself is a short cul-de-sac route off Ashton Old Road and the public house and mews dwelling on either side have primarily blank facades and high boundaries along the route, meaning it benefits from limited levels of activity, footfall, passive surveillance and direct overlooking. The adjacent residential property fronting towards Ashton Old Road has extended boundary treatments, a grille to the ground floor gable window and CCTV cameras – indicating it may have experienced crime and disorder issues.

At the end of Club Street is a pedestrian link (fitted with a concrete bollard) onto Backwell Street, with terraced residential properties fronting towards the link and the site itself. The mews/semi-detached residential properties fronting onto Ashton Old Road are served by a communal car park, enclosed with high walls and an automatic sliding vehicular gate, accessed off Backwell Street.

The adjacent residential properties along Backwell Street and Burnam Street are terraced, which front directly onto the street, meaning their front elevations are not protected by any defensible space – leaving windows/doors exposed to nuisance, anti-social behaviour, unauthorised access (if left insecure) and attack. On such terraced streets, resident's vehicles must be parked on-street as they cannot be parked within the curtilage of the dwellings – leaving them exposed to damage/attack. Rear communal alleyways can also leave terraced dwellings vulnerable to unseen rear access and many of them in the locale have been fitted with high communal alleygates as a result.

To the north of the site is a site compound (accessed off Burnam Street) and the fields of Fairfield High School for Girls (accessed off Fairfield Avenue).



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st March 2021 and 28th February 2022.

2.1 Crime Overview

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
20	11	47	339	36	11	5	30	9	5

- 2.1.1 The general volume of crime in the local area is relatively high, with by far the most prevalent type of crime being less serious wounding. Incidents of less serious wounding in the area, including assaults and threatening behaviour, have mostly occurred around/off the main arterial routes of Ashton Old Road and Fairfield Road.
- 2.1.2 As this Crime Impact Statement has been prepared for a residential development the more detailed analysis below will look at residential burglary and vehicle crime.

2.2 Crime Rate Comparisons

The rates below relate to crimes committed within 500m of the site.

- 2.2.1 The rate of domestic burglaries (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **65% lower** than the rate for Manchester as a whole and **40% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester.
- 2.2.2 The rate of woundings (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **20% higher** than the rate for Manchester and **88% higher** than the rate for Greater Manchester as a whole.
- 2.2.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **41% lower** than the rate for Manchester and **15% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester as a whole.
- 2.2.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime (i.e. incidents per 1,000 dwellings) in the local area is **57% lower** than the rate for Manchester and **57% lower** than the rate for Greater Manchester as a whole.

2.3 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.

- 2.3.1 Recorded burglary dwelling offences have mostly occurred on the residential streets to the west and north-east of the site.
- 2.3.2 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of domestic burglary in the local area peaks on Tuesday and Friday.
- 2.3.3 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk peaks during the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target properties at night, when it is dark, streets are typically quieter than during the day and they perceive a lower risk of being witnessed or identified.
- 2.3.4 **Point of Entry:** Offenders have primarily targeted the rear of properties, forcing open secure rear doors and targeting garden sheds. Offenders have also targeted insecure windows and doors, particularly in shared accommodation buildings.

2.4 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The information below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.

- 2.4.1 Recorded vehicle crime offences have mostly taken place to the west of the site, around/off Ashton Old Road. Criminal damage to vehicles and theft from vehicles have been the highest recorded vehicle offences taking place in the area. Offenders have smashed glazing to cause damage and gain access to vehicle to steal items. They have also removed car parts and registration plates, as well as damaged tyres and vehicle paintwork.
- 2.4.2 **Day Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks over the weekend.

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- 2.4.3 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of vehicle crimes peaks during the late morning. Vehicles parked within open communal areas or on-street, where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked within the curtilages of individual properties or within secure garages/car parks.

2.5 General Risk Factors

- 2.5.1 The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Anti-social behaviour
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Neighbour disputes
- Poor maintenance of access control systems
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.6 Crime Summary

- 2.6.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent MOs (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting residential properties and parked vehicles are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- Doors (particularly to the rear of properties) have been targeted most frequently and have either been forced open with bodily pressure/implements or they have been targeted when left insecure.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (i.e. to BS PAS 24, STS 201 or LPS 1175 SR2), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection.

A robust audio-visual access control system should be in place to allow residents to vet visitors to any apartment block before allowing them access. The main communal entrance to the block should be located in a highly visible position and should be well-lit to deter offenders from trying to gain unauthorised access. Consideration could also be given to 'airlock' lobby system, which features a secondary entrance door that only releases when the external door has closed, reducing the opportunities for tailgating unnoticed. All individual internal apartment entrance doors should be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (see above), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.) cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection.

The locks to the front entrance doors of houses should be fitted with split-spindles or fixed external handles, essentially meaning they are key only entry and are secure from the exterior of the dwelling when shut. This will ensure that they cannot be left open and accessible.

All private spaces to the sides/rears of the dwellings should be robustly enclosed, particularly where adjacent to publicly accessible space, to deter unauthorised access. Open pedestrian routes/accessible land to the rear of the properties should be avoided. Lighting to the front and rear of dwellings can also deter and reveal potential intruders, as well as reduce the fear of crime.

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- Windows have also been forced open/targeted when left insecure, but to a lesser degree.

Possible Solution - All ground floor/accessible windows should also be certified to recognised security standards (i.e. to BS PAS 24), with key operated locks and opening restrictors.

Clearly defined defensible space between dwelling frontages and the 'street' can provide a degree of separation between public and semi-private space and act as a psychological barrier to some offenders, who are more likely to feel under observation/scrutiny from the street or overlooking properties. Such boundary definitions can also reduce the risk of criminal damage and nuisance/anti-social behaviour.

- Offenders have gained access to rear gardens to force open doors to sheds.

Possible Solution – Again, unauthorised access to the rear of properties should be deterred by robust boundaries and the avoidance of open pedestrian routes/publicly accessible areas to their rear where possible.

Any sheds should be of robust construction (i.e. minimum 38x50mm planed timber frame; floor and roof constructed from minimum 11mm boards; and minimum 11x125mm tongue & grooved board walls and door), with coach-bolted hinges, two hasp and staples to meet 'Sold Secure' Silver and two padlocks to meet 'Solid Secure' Silver or LPS 1654 SR1.

- Vehicles have been targeted when parked on the street or within publicly accessible communal parking areas

Possible Solution - It is essential that the development is designed so that resident's vehicles are secured and overlooked. It is preferable that all houses either have the provision to garage vehicles or have in-curtilage car parking arrangements, well-overlooked from habitable room windows. Ideally, any surface communal parking areas serving apartment buildings or groups of houses should be located directly in front of the dwellings they serve, clearly separated from the streets or any areas of adjacent open space/pedestrian routes. Any side, rear, undercroft or basement communal parking areas must be secured to prevent unauthorised access to where hidden doors, windows and parked vehicles could be attacked unseen.

3 Design Considerations

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The outline proposal is to erect 3 no. apartments and 23 no. 2/3/4 bed houses, with associated parking and landscaping.
- 3.1.2 The scheme is in outline at present and, although an illustrative site masterplan has been prepared, approval for the layout of the development is not being sought at this stage. The indicative layout shows that the site will be accessed off Club Street, with the houses and apartment block fronting onto a new cul-de-sac off Club Street, with 4 no. houses fronting onto Backwell Street (and the pedestrian link between it and Club Street). The majority of the houses will be served by in-curtilage driveways and the apartments/3 no. dwellings fronting onto Backwell Street will be served by a side/rear gated communal car park.
- 3.1.3 The following issues are highlighted at this stage and should be addressed in the detailed design of the scheme.

3.2 Recommendations

- 3.2.1 The proposed dwellings should front onto Club Street/Backwell Street, in order to create 'active frontages' and maximize surveillance over visitors and the public realm routes. The proposed dwellings should all have habitable room windows to their front elevations (at ground floor level) and their design should be kept simple, with no front doors to houses hidden in deep recesses or behind building lines (where they would be vulnerable to attack unseen). The main communal entrance to the apartment block must also be located in a prominent position, to ensure that surveillance opportunities over the entrance itself and any residents/visitors coming to/from it are maximised. It should be formed by a security-certified doorset (see below) and should be single-leaf, self-closing and fitted with secure video access controls so that residents can vet callers to the building before allowing them access. In addition to a robust access control system for visitors, there should also be a secure system for the delivery of post that ensures access to all floors of apartment building is not required.
- 3.2.2 The boundary treatments to the houses and apartment blocks are vitally important to secure them, any parked vehicles and prevent unauthorised access to private spaces. The sides (including gables up to or as close as possible to the front building line) and rears of the houses and apartments should be defined as private space and adequately secured (with 2100mm high boundaries/gates) to prevent unauthorised access, particularly robustly where adjacent to publicly accessible space/routes. The front elevations of houses and apartment block should be protected by some defensible space, creating front garden areas/driveways that are clearly defined as separate from the adjacent public highways and each other, in ownership/control of the residents themselves. Encouraging residents/legitimate users to feel a sense of ownership and responsibility for their surroundings can make an important contribution to community safety and crime prevention. Uncertainty of ownership can reduce responsibility and increase the likelihood of crime and anti-social behaviour going unchallenged.
- 3.2.3 It is essential that the development is designed so that resident's vehicles are secured and overlooked. It is preferable that all houses either have the provision to garage vehicles or have in-curtilage car parking arrangements, well-overlooked from habitable room windows. Any driveways/garages provided to the rear of individual properties (e.g. on corner plots), where vehicles would be hidden from view from the residents themselves, should be incorporated into the rear gardens of the dwellings behind high fencing/vehicular gates. The proposed side/rear communal parking area serving the houses/apartments should be securely enclosed and fitted with a 2100mm high automatic vehicular gate/s, to prevent unauthorised access to where the rear of properties and parked vehicles could be attacked unseen. Any rear entrance to the apartment block (off the communal car park) should be for the use of residents only and any adjacent rear boundaries to houses should be partially visually permeable, to allow residents to overlook their vehicles.
- 3.2.4 Any shared/communal side and rear access alleyways serving the dwellings should be gated at their outermost point to prevent unauthorised access to where the dwellings could be attacked unseen. The gates themselves should be 2100mm high and ideally self-closing/locking that cannot be left unlocked when shut.

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- 3.2.5 As part of the community consultation undertaken by the developer, a suggestion was received to include pedestrian access from the eastern end of the proposed cul-de-sac access road to the existing gated alleyway at the rear of the terraced dwellings fronting onto Burman Street. We would not recommend this. Rear access alleyways should only be accessible to the residents of the properties they serve and the number of access points should be limited in number, in order to reduce the opportunities for unauthorised access and avoid diluting legitimate access/use. As the residents of the proposed development should not require access to the adjacent alleyway, it is not advised that an additional connection point is added in this location.
 - 3.2.6 Physical protection measures should be incorporated into the constructed of the dwellings (including Secured by Design compliant doors, windows, glazing etc.) in order to make it harder for an offender to commit a crime and raising the risk of detection (see Section 4.1 for more information).
 - 3.2.7 A successful lighting scheme deters and reveals potential intruders and reduces the fear of crime. Lighting levels should be good, but not oppressive and evenly distributed. Lighting should be provided to all roads/footpaths, parking areas and to the front/rear of all dwellings.
 - 3.2.8 Any proposed landscaping features (hard or soft) in front of dwellings/buildings or around parking areas should not impede natural surveillance of/from the buildings/spaces or create climbing aids over any boundaries. Future soft landscaping growth and maintenance must be taken into account at the design stage.
 - 3.2.9 The phasing of building works and bringing into use parts of the scheme while others are undeveloped or under construction can significantly affect security. Uncompleted access roads/footpaths should be secured until such time as they are completed and surveillance opportunities are maximised from occupied buildings or dwellings. Care should also be taken to ensure that any hoardings erected around development sites do not create secluded passageways and blind spots, or become targets for criminal damage. It is recommended that while construction work progresses and occupancy levels of completed properties are low, an on-site security presence is maintained.

4 Useful References

4.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. The latest SBD guidance relating to new residential developments can be found at <http://www.securedbydesign.com/industry-advice-and-guides/>.

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
28 th February 2022	Bramhall Town Planning	Receipt of CIS instruction form & plans
1 st March 2022	Bramhall Town Planning	Quote issued, confirmation of instruction/fee & email correspondence re: timescales
6 th & 11 th March 2022	Bramhall Town Planning	Email correspondence re: invoice
14 th March 2022	Bramhall Town Planning	Email correspondence re: potential pedestrian connection to existing alleyway
31 st March 2022	Bramhall Town Planning	Email correspondence re: timescales & payment (not received as yet)
1 st April 2022	Bramhall Town Planning	Email sent re: report completion & payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
BG-EWA-ZZ-00-DR-A-04-70400	Illustrative Masterplan (not for determination)	18/02/22	P0
BG-EWA-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-70401	Site Location Plan	16/02/22	P0
BG-EWA-ZZ-ZZ-DR-A-70402	Access Plan	16/02/22	P0
BG-EWA-ZZ-ZZ-EL-A-70404	Street Scene – Backwell Street	16/02/22	P0
-	Design & Access Statement	Feb 2022	-
-	Screenshot showing potential pedestrian link to existing alleyway	-	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing
- b) Performance of hardware
- c) Resistance to static loading
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk