



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

98 Wilmslow Road

42 Apartments and Retail (541sqm)

For: **Mr Patrick Sheridan**

Version A: **14/02/22**

Ref: **2016/0813/CIS/03**

Greater Manchester Police

design**for**security

98 Wilmslow Road

2016/0813/CIS/03

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Development Supported - Minor security additions

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, which includes:

- External lighting & CCTV consideration.
- Robust ground floor façade & door specification.
- Access control throughout the building.
- Access control to car parking & cycle store
- Visitor cycle hoop location.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Sections 4 & 5 of this report.

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1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.



The main commercial elevation faces onto Wilmslow Rd. The site is situated at the junction of Wilmslow Rd and Grandale St.

The main arterial road running through Rusholme; Wilmslow Rd, is a popular destination synonymous with a mix of Asian restaurants, café bars and culture. This area of Rusholme is commonly known as 'The curry mile'.

The curry mile is very busy road throughout the day and night and therefore vehicle parking is in high demand. The popularity of the area causes tensions between residents and visitors in relation to parking & driving issues.

The neighbouring side streets in the vicinity of the proposed site are predominately populated with terrace housing which are interspersed with smaller commercial premises.

This Crime Impact Statement is a post planning application report in relation to the current site use. The site is currently in use as a restaurant and café bar called 'Purples Café'. Previously the site had been used as a motor vehicle service/repair centre. The current use of restaurant/café/bar has retained the existing vehicle service/repair building.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st January 2021 to 31st December 2021.

Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
48	54	110	469	177	47	17	141	17	37

- 2.1.1 Over the last 12 months, the volume of recorded crime in this neighbourhood has been high, particularly crimes involving violence, burglary, vehicle crime and theft. The Wilmslow Road / Oxford Road corridor, with its concentration of commercial uses, including licensed premises, university and hospital campuses, and car parks, together with high footfall throughout the day and night are all contributory reasons for the high volume of crime. The majority of crime has taken place along Wilmslow Road and the streets leading directly off this road.
- 2.1.2 Violence in the local area has involved assaults, public order offences and harassment. Offences have taken place within the home, as well as public spaces (mostly along Wilmslow Road). Violence has involved domestic disputes and incidents between known associates.
- 2.1.3 Wilmslow Road to the north of the site and Claremont Road has experienced the largest volume of thefts. Offenders have removed insecure parcels left outside dwellings, as well as goods from local retail businesses. Offenders have also removed wheel clamps placed on vehicles by the council and made off with them.
- 2.1.4 Theft from a motor vehicle has been the highest recorded vehicle crime taking place in the local area. Offenders have smashed glazing in order to gain access to the vehicle, as well as targeting insecure vehicles removing items stored within. Offenders have also used tools in order to remove vehicle parts, with registration plates and catalytic converters most commonly targeted.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Having looked at the crime data for the site and the surrounding area, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting local residential properties and Manchester commercial/retail premises are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- 2.2.2 **Residential:** Entering apartment buildings by means of tailgating residents/ exploiting insecure doors and accessing communal areas (mostly corridors/ post and bike storage areas).

Possible Solution - All individual apartments should be secured with a security-certified entrance doorset (see Section 4.1), to ensure that any offender who may have gained access to the building (e.g. by tailgating, posing as a legitimate visitor etc.), cannot gain further access without drawing the attention of other residents. Doors off internal corridors should not be located in deep recesses, where an offender could operate without fear of detection. A staffed 24/7 concierge desk will support the management and security of the entrance lobby.

- 2.2.3 **General:** Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.

Possible Solution - Front doors should include a split spindle mechanism which locks on closure and can only be opened from outside with a key.

- 2.2.4 **General:** Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain entry to the property.

Possible Solution – All ground floor/accessible windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.4), with key operated locks and opening restrictors. All ground floor/accessible glazing should also include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration (see Section 5.4). Any glazed panels in or around doors should be small and set well-away from locking points.

- 2.2.5 **General:** Forcing open shutters using implements and tools in order to gain access to the doors and windows located beneath.

Possible Solution – (If proposed within the development), Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 5.2) has an independently proven level of resistance and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc) have been scrutinised by professionals. Avoid locating shutters in concealed areas where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed. Ensure that parked vehicles and stored materials do not obscure sight lines.

- 2.2.6 **General:** Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.

Possible Solution – All ground floor / accessible glazing should include a laminated pane which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Ensure that rubbish and loose material is removed from the areas around the site. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within or directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

- 2.2.7 **Commercial/Retail:** Posing as a legitimate customer and entering restricted areas by means of insecure doors and tailgating employees.

Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 5.1).

- 2.2.8 **Café/Restaurant:** Theft of personal property from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables.

Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats. The internal layout of the premises can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment.

- 2.2.9 **Commercial/Retail:** Organised burglars targeting expensive I.T. equipment.

Possible Solution - Secure store rooms, where such items can be kept, should be incorporated into the design of the building or fit-out. These rooms should have solid blockwork walls or be reinforced with expanded metal mesh and certified door sets (to BS PAS 24). Valuable items should not be easy to remove, and should be uniquely identified using an appropriate property marking system. Portable equipment should not be positioned in communal areas where there may be regular visitor access. Effective access controls within the building should assist in restricting entry of visitors and potential intruders.

2.3 Risk Factors - Residential

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems





2.4 Risk Factors - Retail

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Commercial burglary
- Cash robbery
- Unauthorised access to private spaces/Tailgating
- Shoplifting
- Employee theft
- Theft of customer / staff property
- Criminal damage to property

2.5 Comparing crime rates in the neighbourhood around the site to those in Manchester and Greater Manchester




The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2020.



- 2.5.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **53% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **18% lower** than Greater Manchester and **17% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **36% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **113% higher** than Greater Manchester and **128% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwelling is **23% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **12% higher** than Greater Manchester and **67% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.5.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **1% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **80% higher** than Greater Manchester and **214% higher** than England & Wales.

2.6 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.





2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Wednesday, Friday and Saturday, during the early hours of the morning (3am – 5:30am). Offenders often target properties during the early hours of the morning when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.

2.6.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.
- Smashed glazing in windows and doors using implements.
- In cases where the entry point is, "unknown" offenders are likely to have exploited insecure windows and doors.
- Posing as a legitimate tradesperson and gaining unauthorised access to the property, removing items from within.
- Entering the rear garden of the property and using bodily pressure and implements gain access to the garden shed.

2.7 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis


The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.7.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Monday and Saturday during the afternoon (2pm – 5pm) and late evening (8pm – 11:59pm). Offenders often target vehicles during the afternoon and evening as vehicles are often left unattended and out of sight of the owner, for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

2.8 Non-Domestic Burglary Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.





2.8.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Wednesday. During the day the risk of burglary at retail premises increases in the early hours of the morning (12am – 6am). Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed and the streets are quiet. Offenders perceive the risk of being witnessed or apprehended at its lowest.

2.8.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been the occurred most frequently:

- Smashed glazing in windows and doors to gain entry to premises.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and tailgating / exploitation insecure doors to gain access to staff only areas.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily force and implements to gain entry.
- Opening secure doors using bodily pressure and implements to gain entry.

2.9 Theft Retail Facilities: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within / against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.9.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of theft from retail premises in Manchester is consistently high throughout the week, peaking on a Friday and Saturday. During the day the risk of theft at retail premises peaks in the late morning and into the evening (10:30am – 8pm). Small, personal items are being targeted, mostly mobile phones, purses and bags.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development seeks to demolish the existing buildings on site and provide a single building offering 6 ground floor retail premises facing onto Wilmslow Road and Grandale Street with 42 residential apartments above.
- 3.1.2 Vehicle access will be provided to the secure car park off Grandale Street. The car park will contain 12 parking spaces and will also house storage for bicycles and bins.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The building will present an active frontage to Wilmslow Road and Grandale Street, enlivening the street scene and helping to provide useful natural surveillance over the surrounding public realm (particularly when the commercial units are operational).
- 3.2.2 There are clearly-defined, entirely separate entrances serving the commercial and residential uses proposed, which reduces the opportunities for confusion and conflict and reduces the opportunities for criminals to exploit.
- 3.2.3 For pedestrian visitors to the apartments, there will be only one entrance point into the building, which allows security to be focussed on this location.
- 3.2.4 The apartments will be provided well-above street level, meaning that residents' possessions cannot be easily observed and unauthorised entry is more effectively deterred. This also reduces the potential impacts of excessive noise, nuisance and anti-social behaviour (particularly at night).
- 3.2.5 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design/construction of the scheme. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design/specification of the scheme can ensure it is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Mailbox location. Arrangements for delivery of post should not need postal delivery staff to have access to internal corridors and stairwells of the residential block. Mailboxes for residents should be located either within a secure lobby area or use a "through-the-wall" arrangement allowing external delivery / internal collection.
- 3.3.2 Residential post/parcel/grocery room. Arrangements for the delivery of post should not allow postal or grocery delivery staff to have access to internal areas of the residential block beyond the GF reception space. Postal workers should not be given unfettered access to the entire building as this could potentially leave apartments and residents vulnerable. (see Section 4.1 for more information)
- 3.3.3 Balconies and external elevations generally. The cladding / facing materials should not provide external aids to climbing that could allow an intruder to gain access to the upper floor balconies. The detailing of the façades and the relationship between the building and any other external landscape features / street furniture will need to be carefully planned to avoid introducing this kind of vulnerability.
- 3.3.4 Graffiti on surfaces. This kind of abuse is particularly prevalent in the vicinity of the site. It is important that external cladding materials at ground floor are sealed, protected and supports the removal of graffiti, a resistant coating applied to enable easy removal of any unauthorised markings. The external space should not contain climbing aids that could allow an intruder to gain access to the upper floor balconies. The detailing of the façade and any proposed external landscape features will need to be considered to avoid introducing an access vulnerability point into the building.
- 3.3.5 Communal facility maintenance. The robust management of such features is essential as poor management and maintenance can lead to a downward spiral of neglect and loss of environmental quality, encouraging nuisance, vandalism and other anti-social or criminal behaviour.

-
- 3.3.6 Cycle stores for residents' are provided to the rear of the building. Entry to the stores must be restricted to genuine cyclists only, on application to the managers of the building. Racks within the enclosures should allow cyclists to lock the frame and both wheels, and should be obtained from a Secured by Design-approved supplier (see www.securedbydesign.com for details).
- 3.3.7 Security measures carefully incorporated into the building design can ensure the building is reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime. The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the building and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime.

4 Physical Security (Residential)

In addition to the layout issues highlighted in section 3, the following checklist (sections 4-7) forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation if required.

4.1 Doors

- ☐ External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to STS202 BR2 or LPS 1175 SR2. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system linked to the concierge desk, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- ☐ Arrangements for residents to admit visitors. Communal entrance and inner lobby / zone doors should be capable of being controlled by means of a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on a phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can confirm the identity of visitors before allowing them access themselves.
- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to STS202 BR2, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
- ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS01, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is advised that these doors do not have fixed sidelights, and are provided with door viewers instead.
- ☐ Doors to storage / meter rooms should have 44mm solid core doors, 3 hinges, with a mortised sash lock to BS3621/8621 to allow the rooms to be secured when not in use.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
Ground floor and easily-accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing

Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P1A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is installed, it should be linked to contacts on all external doors, and PIR detectors should cover all ground floor rooms with windows.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - Main Entrance doors

- Secondary entrance doors off internal lobbies
- Bin stores
- Cycle stores
- Staff-only areas

4.6 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [Main entrances](#), [foyer](#), [stairs](#), [lift lobbies](#), [landings](#), [cycle stores](#), [bin store entrances](#).

4.7 Other

- ☐ Meter cupboards to apartments should be located to the fronts of properties only or within a secure cupboard / room inside the block but not inside individual apartments. Smart meters are acceptable.
- ☐ Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- ☐ Partition walls between flats and corridors should be of masonry construction or include reinforcement such as a layer of expanded metal mesh.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction, and minimise the amount of metal on visible elevations of the buildings. Inspection covers should be capable of securing to reduce potential access to cabling.

5 Physical security (none residential)

All new-build elements should be constructed in accordance with the following standards to demonstrate a level of physical security acceptable to Design for Security.

5.1 Doors

- ☐ External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS02, or LPS 1175 SR2.
- ☐ Sliding doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24:2012, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- ☐ Internal doors to storage rooms should be solid core, minimum 44mm thick with a multi-point locking mechanism.
- ☐ Garage or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.

5.2 Shutters

- ☐ Where grilles or shutters are required for additional protection the minimum certification required is:
 - LPS 1175: Issue 7 Security Rating 1
 - STS 202: Issue 3, Burglary Rating 1

5.3 Windows

- ☐ Windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24 or BS 7950.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

5.4 Glazing

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

5.5 Alarms

- ☐ A monitored alarm system should be installed to cover all building on the site, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors covering all ground floor areas with windows, with a signal terminating at a recognized Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) or security control room. Additional fuse spurs should be incorporated into each apartment to allow residents the option of installing a private alarm for their property.

5.6 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following doors should operate on access control:
 - All external doors where regular staff access is required.
 - Doors separating internal zones / lobbies
 - Any internal doors to obvious high risk or controlled areas (e.g. storage / server / locker rooms)
 - Cycle store

5.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the site in accordance with BS 5489.

- ☐ Lighting to vehicle circulation areas, service yards and car parks should be in accordance with BS 5489, and display an average lux level of 20 with a uniformity level of no less than 25%. These figures should be evidenced by a lighting layout/lux plan.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.
- ☐ Internal lighting should be operated by detection devices which will automatically switch lights on with movement activity in each room.

5.8 CCTV

- ☐ Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- ☐ **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- ☐ **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: Entrances to site, external areas all around the new building and ancillary facilities, external doors including emergency egresses / hatches, access-controlled doors & cycle parking areas.

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

-
- 6.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
13/01/22	Avison Young	CIS instructed
18/12/22	Avison Young	CIS confirmed
02/12/22	GMP	Invoice issued
16/02/22	DfS	Site visit
23/02/22	DfS	CIS issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
	A454_P_001-LOCATION PLAN	11/02/22	
	A454_P_100-PROPOSED GROUND FLOOR PLAN	11/02/22	
	A454_P_101-PROPOSED FIRST FLOOR PLAN	11/02/22	
	A454_P_102-PROPOSED SECOND FLOOR PLAN	11/02/22	
	A454_P_103-PROPOSED THIRD FLOOR PLAN	11/02/22	
	A454_P_105-PROPOSED ROOF PLAN	11/02/22	
	A454_P_310-PROPOSED ELEVATION A	11/02/22	
	A454_P_311-PROPOSED ELEVATION B	11/02/22	
	A454_P_312-PROPOSED ELEVATION C	11/02/22	
	A454_P_313-PROPOSED ELEVATION D	11/02/22	
	A454_P_400-PROPOSED SITE SECTION AA	11/02/22	
	A454_P_401-PROPOSED SITE SECTION BB	11/02/22	

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door-sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door-set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk