



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Hanover Street, central Manchester

Bar and Office

for: NOMA

Greater Manchester Police

version A: 23rd November 2021

design**for**security

URN: 2015/0559/CIS/02

Hanover Street, central Manchester

2015/0559/CIS/02

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Major Design Changes Not Required

This development has been assessed using the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' in order to identify any opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

In general the proposed scheme has been found acceptable, although further consideration of some aspects is advised, as stated in section 3.3 of this report.

The success of this proposal will be reliant on effective management of the premises, and our support for this development is dependent on adoption of the measures highlighted in section 5.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Michael Craig', with a stylized flourish at the end.

Michael Craig DipLD CMLI

Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site, shown red on plan, lies in the NOMA district of central Manchester. This neighbourhood contains a mix of commercial premises, including offices and leisure facilities together with residential development. There is a high level of construction activity around the site as further regeneration takes place in the vicinity. There are some significant leisure attractions nearby that draw large numbers of people to the neighbourhood. Major transport facilities close by include Shudehill Bus Station and MSCP, Victoria railway station and two Metrolink tram stops.

The site adjoins Sadler's Yard, an attractive area of public open space developed about 6 years ago. The northern and eastern sides of the site abut the rear of substantial commercial buildings. A kiosk is positioned close to the site entrance and provides takeaway drinks and snacks during the daytime.


The site is occupied by the structures of the licensed premises which is now well established on the site, and comprises a single storey building with associated external seating space and landscaping.



View of site from adjacent public space




View of site from Hanover Street




Existing vegetation near entrance to site



North end of site showing existing servery



View of site from adjacent public space



Entrance to site – note position of waste bins

2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st October 2020 to 30th September 2021.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
58	125	298	1306	822	110	22	618	40	132

- 2.1.1 The overall reported crime rate in the local area is high for Manchester. The highest recorded crimes are less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 The majority of assaults and public order offences have taken place to the South of the proposed site, around High Street and Shudehill and to the east where the Northern Quarter is located which has a high volume of bars, restaurants and retail premises. The assaults that have taken place have mostly carried out in the late evening and early hours of the morning over the weekend period. Unknown offenders have usually carried out the assaults and alcohol is usually a contributing factor.
- 2.1.3 Thefts in the area have mostly taken place in the Arndale Centre, which is the main shopping area, as well as Thomas Street and Great Ancoats Street which has a concentration of licenced premises and retail facilities. The most common M.O (modus operandi) has been pick-pocketing small items, mostly mobile phones and wallets, as well as grabbing mobile phones from tables and bags in licenced premises.
- 2.1.4 Theft from a motor vehicle has been the most common occurring vehicle crime in the area, with smashed glazing in order to gain access to the vehicle, as well as tools used in order to remove vehicle parts / registration plates being most commonly reported. Theft from a motor vehicle has mostly occurred to the East and North West of the proposed site, where private car parks are located.

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Opening of secured doors and windows using bodily force or implements to gain entry.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards, which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. The most vulnerable doors and windows should be protected with shutters or internal security blinds, together with alarms and CCTV.

- 2.2.2 Smashing glazing in windows and doors to gain entry.

Possible Solution – All new ground floor / accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane, which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within / directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.

- 2.2.3 Offenders posing as legitimate customers, gaining access to staff only areas.

Possible Solution - Staff-only areas should be effectively separated, both visually and physically, so that customers cannot readily gain entry. This can be achieved by the use of access-controlled doors or barriers, but they should create a clear distinction so that any intruder can be more easily identified. There should be provision within the staff only areas for the secure storage of personal belongings while at work.

2.2.4 Shutters have been prised open to target doors / windows behind them

Possible Solution - Any shutters should be certified to LPS 1175 SR2. Shutters should be mounted integrally, so that boxes are less vulnerable to tampering. Use of shutters in more concealed areas, where a concerted attack from an offender is unlikely to be witnessed or detected, should be of a higher security certification, or consider use of additional protection such as internal security blinds or grilles, together with alarms and CCTV. A security-certified shutter (see Section 4.2) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals.

2.2.5 Theft of personal property from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables.

Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' (see below) to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats. The internal layout of the premises can also increase surveillance opportunities and help deter offenders. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.




2.3 Risk Factors – Licenced Premises

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence / conflict
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery / wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.1 Non-Domestic Burglary (Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against licenced premises, recorded in the Manchester area.




2.1.1 **Day / Time Range:** In Manchester, the risk of burglary at licensed premises between Monday and Wednesday and is lowest on Friday. The risk of burglary is highest in the early hours of the morning. Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed and the areas / streets where they are typical found are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive the risk of being detected or identified as low.

2.1.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Forcing open secure doors and windows – mostly fire doors located to the side and rear of the property are targeted – using bodily pressure and implements to gain access.
- Posing as a legitimate customer and exploiting insecure doors / tailgating staff into restricted areas, taking property belonging to employees and the business.
- Forcing open shutters using bodily pressure and implements to access the doors and windows located below.
- Broken glazing to windows and doors – located mostly to the front of the property, with glass in doors highly targeted- using bricks or implements located around the scene.

2.2 Theft (Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis


The data below relates to thefts within / against licenced premises, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.2.1 **Day / Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester licensed premises peaks over the weekend. On these days, many premises within the city centre area experience higher levels of attendance than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunity for offenders to commit theft is greater. The risk of theft peaks late at night and into the early morning. This reflects the times when licensed premises are at their busiest and therefore the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses / wallets, cash and phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items - usually stolen from table tops, from bags hung on chairs / stored under tables or via pickpocketing and distraction methods. Theft of property belonging to staff is also common, with offenders posing as legitimate customers to gain access to unauthorised areas.

2.3 Non-Domestic Burglary Offices: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within / against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.





2.3.1 **Day / Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester peaks on Tuesday and Sunday. During the day, the risk of burglary rises at night / into the early hours of the morning. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.

2.3.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area, the following entry points have been utilised most frequently:

- Secure doors have been forced open using body pressure, implements and tools. Many burglaries committed in Manchester office buildings do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing equipment with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks.
- A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.
- Glazing within windows and doors has been smashed to gain unauthorised access.
- Shutters have been prised open to target doors and windows behind them.

2.4 Theft Offices: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within / against offices, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.4.1 **Day / Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest during the working week, when the opportunities to offend are greater, and is significantly lower at the weekend, when many offices premises are closed or operate on reduced opening hours / staffing levels. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out.

2.5 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.5.1 **Day / Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area peaks on a Thursday and a Saturday, during the afternoon and into the evening (12pm – 10pm). City Centres see an increased volume of footfall over the weekend period, whereby vehicles are often left unattended for long periods of time, creating a perceived low risk opportunity for the offender(s).

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development comprises an established bar operation, and construction of an additional structure to accommodate sheltered seating on the external terrace of the existing premises.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The existing site management practices have been largely successful in excluding intruders and preventing disorder at the premises. There are established security protocols which can be adapted / extended to cover the additional development.
- 3.2.2 The establishment helps to provide legitimate activity in the neighbourhood and animates the adjacent area public open space thus increasing the informal policing of the area.
- 3.2.3 The main entrances for customers / users of the bar are in obvious locations and are readily apparent on approaching the building. Customers are easily be able to identify the appropriate access points, therefore offenders have no pretext for being present in private or restricted areas.
- 3.2.4 Customer Toilets. These have been located away from the entrance, reducing the possibility of misuse and opportunities for bilking.

3.3 Further Recommendations to Improve Security

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 Location of structure. Any secluded space between existing and proposed structures should be accessible to staff only, with customers prevented from gaining access. The more remote areas must not be publicly-accessible, with robust barriers to prevent unauthorised access. The division between public and staff-only areas should be readily obvious so that people know where they should and shouldn't have access to. There must be no features of the building envelope which create sheltered / hiding places or ledges, which could endanger passers-by or encourage loitering.
- 3.3.2 Customers using the new pavilion structure should be capable of being monitored by bar staff, using a combination of direct sight through the windows and comprehensive CCTV coverage inside the new structure. The proposed structure should be capable of securing when not in use to prevent unauthorised access, in particular when the establishment is closed. The construction should be fire and graffiti resistant.
- 3.3.3 Review of CCTV / lighting. The site-wide lighting and CCCTV systems should be adapted to reflect the proposed changes to the layout. CCTV cameras should be capable of identifying all pedestrian movements into and out of the site as well as the entrances and elevations. To facilitate the CCTV system, dusk until dawn lighting should be provided, particularly around the access doors. Signage should be located at the site entrance to inform visitors that their movements will be monitored and recorded.
- 3.3.4 There should be no features of the structures (existing or proposed) which may facilitate unauthorised climbing up to higher levels / roof. The position of street furniture, tables and chairs should be carefully considered in relation to this issue.
- 3.3.5 Any external seating for the restaurant / bar premises should be located where staff can easily monitor customer behaviour. Seats should have sloping backs (to discourage customers from hanging bags over them), and tables should be equipped with "Chelsea clips".

4 Physical Security

The proposed development comprises an extension the current structure, thus the capacity to make alterations and upgrade the physical security of the existing construction is limited. The following recommendations are made on this understanding, but should apply to any new installations. If the identified security risks cannot be addressed by design solutions, the protection of the building and its occupants / users will be dependent on effective management and deployment of an on-site security presence and / or monitored alarms / CCTV.

4.1 Doors

- External doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24:2012, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2 (this includes any French windows and sliding patio doors).
- Sliding doors should be tested and certified to ENV 1627-30 (WK2+). If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.
- External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.
- Letterboxes within doors must be located a minimum of 400mm away from internal handle and locking hardware.
- Garage or sectional overhead doors must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2. If circumstances could prevent this, please consult with Design for Security.

4.2 Windows and Shutters

- Any new windows must be compliant with and certified to BS 7950, must be key-lockable, and have fixed / lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.
- Any shutters must be tested and certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required), and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Shutters should either be provided internally or, if they are to be externally mounted, shutter boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building (where they would be less visually intrusive and less vulnerable to damage)

4.3 Glazing

- Any new external glazing must incorporate at least one pane of laminated glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.

4.4 Alarms

- An intruder alarm should be installed linked to contacts on all external doors and PIR detectors should cover any rooms with windows.
- It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (be that an alert to the key holder, or to a security patrol team).

4.5 Lighting

- Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell / daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow / orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.

4.6 CCTV

- Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:
- CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an acceptable standard that will allow for identification of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.
- **Acceptable Standard** - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).
- **Identification** – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are 'Overview' and 'Recognition', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.
- The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [external doors](#), [till points](#) / [bar areas](#), [the entrance](#) / [waiting areas](#) / [external seating](#).

4.7 Other

- Any externally-mounted rainwater pipes should be square in profile and fixed back to the building fabric to prevent climbing to upper floor windows.
- There have been incidents involving metal theft from the area. Consideration should be given to use of alternatives to lead in construction.
-

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The application does not involve major physical changes to the overall establishment. As such the success of the proposal will be dependent on effective management of the premises and a zero tolerance policy should be adopted with customers who behave inappropriately.
- 5.1.2 Bars can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:
- **Opportunities** - Patrons of bars can be stationary for extended periods of time making them easier to target.
 - **Lack of attention** - The movement of people, noise, social interaction, and other factors mean patrons are easily distracted.
 - **Customer turnover** – High customer turnover with high levels of customer movement within the establishment offer greater anonymity and allow more opportunities for offenders to operate unnoticed.
 - **Valuable goods** – These are often available and likely to be on show, (a particular problem on any external seating areas). Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, portable goods – mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys, etc. and people often make use of these items when sitting in a bar.
 - **Stealth** - Busy venues can provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences
- 5.1.3 In order to minimise these and other security issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:
- Customers entering / leaving the premises through the main entrances should be easily observed by staff.
 - All back-of-house / staff areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.
 - Large amounts of cash should not be stored in the premises and signage should be installed to indicate this. Consideration should be given to a chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods. It would be beneficial to run a cashless business, with all payments taken by card – leaving the premises less vulnerable to cash robbery.
 - Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach. Casual access to the rear of service counters should be prevented (e.g. with a lockable hatch that cannot be easily scaled). No tills should be kept outside.
 - The internal layout of the premises should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding pinch points.
 - There should be no places for concealment in public areas to allow staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation. Installation of mirrors in strategic locations can assist staff in monitoring areas outside their direct line of sight.
- 5.1.4 Active continuous management and maintenance of the premises can reduce the likelihood of crime and disorder occurring. A maintenance plan should be created to promote good management of the premises, this plan should focus on issues such as:
- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras, lighting, doors and locks etc.
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti;
 - Opening and closing of premises including staff arrival and departure, with particular attention to lone members of staff.
 - Cash management within the premises
 - Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices

- Management of stock deliveries.

5.1.5 Outdoor Seating

- The outdoor seating areas should be supervised and a duty of care exercised to ensure seating does not stray outside the permitted area and cause obstruction to passing pedestrians.
- No seating or tables should be left in accessible areas outside the premises overnight. Seating must be stacked and secured outside the permitted hours of use.

5.1.6 Toilets should be clearly signed so that there is no excuse for customers finding their way to the back of house.

5.1.7 A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development, and should not require bins to be left on the street for extended periods. Servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods.

5.1.8 Permitted opening hours should be the same as similar nearby premises.

5.1.9 High customer turnover in cafe / bars, with high levels of customer movement within the establishment are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed – staff must be able to easily monitor people arriving or leaving the premises from any potential access point.

5.1.10 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers, music equipment, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage / theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.

5.1.11 Opening hours should be in accordance with other similar premises in the area, taking account of the potential for noise nuisance to occupiers of nearby residential / hotel premises.

6 Construction

6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.

6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

Appendix

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
05/10/2021	Jessica Higham	CIS instruction received
20/10/2021	Jessica Higham	Commission confirmed / fee agreed
04/11/2021	N/A	Site visit
04/11/2021	NOMA	Receipt of payment
19/11/2021	Jessica Higham	Progress enquiry / update
23/11/2021	Jessica Higham	CIS version A issued

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
2990-(56)-G-01	Mechanical Services Meeting Layout	28/01/16	T1
2696-PLA-XX-XX-DR-L-0010	Site Layout	16/09/21	P01
2696-PLA-XX-XX-DR-L-0008	Planning Application Boundary	16/09/21	P01
2696-PLA-XX-XX-DR-L-0005	Terrace Structure, Sadler's Yard	16/09/21	P01

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door-set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a

6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB / PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk