



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

DIECAST BEERHALLE & NIGHT MARKET, STORE STREET, MANCHESTER

CHANGE OF USE FROM INDUSTRIAL TO MIXED-USE - INCLUDING BEER
HALL, NIGHT MARKET, CREATIVE & TECH HUB AND USE CLASS E UNITS
(TOTALLING 15,580sqm.)

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

FOR: Diecast Limited

VERSION B: 25/03/2022

REFERENCE: 2022/0052/CIS/01

Presbar Diecast Building, Store Street, Manchester

URN: 2022/0052/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Security improvements recommended

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED) and reviewed in terms of its likely impact upon its surroundings from crime and disorder and public safety perspectives.

The proposal is to re-use the existing vacant industrial/office building as a large, multi-use venue that is likely to be used by a number of different users groups at all times of the day and night, which could be exploited by offenders. Although it is noted that external alterations will be minimal and, therefore, the scheme is unlikely to be eligible for the Secured by Design (SBD) Award (without the replacement of all existing external building elements), it is highly recommended that the appropriate physical security measures contained within Sections 3.3 & 4 of this report are incorporated into the proposed scope of works, namely:

- Replacement of existing chainlink fencing/gates with 2400mm high railings or rigid-panel, welded-wire mesh fencing/gates, which will be more resistant to scaling and penetration.
- Views over Paradise Walk from proposed garden/terrace should be maximised, with a CCTV system monitored by on-site staff ensuring there can be an immediate response to anyone attempting to gain unauthorised access out-of-hours.
- Staffing and monitoring of main entrances to beer hall and night market to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.
- Interior of the building should be capable of being 'zoned', so that each area is capable of being secured while other areas are in use. All internal doors to back-of-house/staff areas should be access controlled to prevent unauthorised access, with a secure cash office and bar containers/any permanent market kiosks capable of being adequately secured.
- Robust control of access to creative/tech offices, both externally and internally from the beer hall space. The internal doors to the retail/commercial units off the beer hall should also be capable of being robustly secured when required. The main entrance to the proposed gym should also be directly overlooked by staff or otherwise controlled to prevent it being targeted by offenders.
- Any new or replacement doorsets, shutters, windows and glazing should be to Secured by Design (SBD) standards and any existing features of the building that may aid an offender to gain access to the roof should be removed or secured to prevent unauthorised access.
- The operational hours of the venue and the external garden/terrace should not conflict with nearby uses.

Subject to all reasonable efforts being made to address these issues, as described within the report, we would be happy to support the development.

The overall security of the proposed scheme will be heavily reliant on the continuous effective management of the venue, rather than just the physical measures recommended in this report. Comprehensive risk assessments should be carried out in advance of events, in order to identify and address potential security issues.



Bradley Hart MTCP

Design for Security Consultant

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1 Visual Audit

The site lies on the north side of Store Street and on the south side of Ducie Street, in the Piccadilly East area of Manchester city centre.

The site occupied by a former aluminium diecast factory and distribution centre with offices, vacated in 2021.

The older original section of the former foundry lies to the east of the site, with brick walls directly abutting Store Street and Ducie Street. The western portion of the site is formed by a more modern block work wall/corrugated steel warehouse structure and two floors of offices, fronting onto a 31 space car park off Store Street. There is also a large service yard to the west of the site, accessed off Ducie Street.


The car park along Store Street, the service/storage yard along Ducie Street and Paradise Walk (along the western boundary of the site) and the warehouse elevation along Ducie Street are all secured with existing high chainlink fencing and vehicular gates off Store Street and Ducie Street.

Chain link fencing is not considered as effective a secure boundary as alternatives (such as railings and welded-wire mesh fencing) as it can often be easily scaled, cut or flexed to create gaps underneath or to aid climbing over (particular where there are large expanses that are not adequately braced/supported).

To the north of the site (on the opposite side of Ducie Street) are commercial/light industrial premises and small pay & display surface car parks. To the west is Paradise Wharf, an apartment scheme adjacent to Ashton Canal. To the south (on the opposite side of Store Street) is a vacant area of land and Oxygen - a recently constructed large apartment complex. The adjoining brick warehouse building to the immediate east of the site is occupied by Stocktons - a home furnishings store with a surface car park to the east, accessed off Great Ancoats Street (A665).

There few leisure uses within the vicinity of the site and the surrounding streets/pedestrian routes are likely to benefit from low levels of activity, footfall, direct overlooking and passive surveillance at night.

Along the western edge of the site is Paradise Walk - a narrow pedestrian route linking Ducie Street and Store Street. The route passes between the high chainlink fencing/vegetation along the perimeter of the site to and high brick walls to Paradise Wharf and the Ashton Canal aqueduct. There are steps up off Store Street at the southern end and a sharp change in direct along it. All of these features mean that views of and along it are somewhat impeded, it is unlikely to be frequently used (particularly at night) and feels unsafe - leaving legitimate users potentially isolated/vulnerable and allowing offenders to access/attack the site perimeter unseen.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st February 2021 & 31st January 2022.

2.1 Crime Summary



Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
45	54	120	519	227	40	13	331	32	51


- 2.1.1 In the local area, the general volume of recorded crime is high, particularly the levels of violence, vehicle crime and theft, reflecting the site's location within the city centre. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of city centres – where there is a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues.
- 2.1.2 Recorded less serious wounding offences have taken place throughout the area local area, particularly to the west of the site - around the Northern Quarter and Piccadilly areas of the city, where there are high concentrations of licenced premises. Assaults and public order offences have been the highest recorded types of less serious wounding, with the majority of offences taking place over the weekend period and during the late evening/early hours of the morning.
- 2.1.3 Theft from a motor vehicle has been the highest recorded vehicle crime in the area, with offences also concentrated on the streets to the west and south (around Piccadilly Station, the Northern Quarter and Piccadilly). Offenders have particularly targeted vehicles parked within open car parks or on-street, smashing glazing to gain access to vehicles and remove items, as well as removing vehicle parts and vehicle registration plates.
- 2.1.4 Thefts have also taken place to the west, around/off Tariff Street and Hilton Street, and around Piccadilly Station to the south. Offenders have primarily used pick-pocketing and distraction methods to obtain personal belongings, as well as targeting insecure bags and mobile phones - particularly within bars/restaurants or on public transport.
- 2.1.5 As this Crime Impact Statement relates to a proposed mixed-use development, the more detailed analysis below will focus on use-specific burglary and theft, as well as local vehicle crime.

2.1 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against licenced premises, recorded in the Manchester area 2018 - 2019.



M/cr Licensed Premises Burglary – Point of Entry




- 2.1.1 **Day Range:** In Manchester, the risk of burglary at licensed premises peaks between Monday and Wednesday and is lowest on Friday.
- 2.1.2 **Time Range:** The risk of burglary is highest in the early hours of the morning. Burglaries at commercial premises frequently take place during the night, when they are closed and the areas/streets where they are typically found are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive the risk of being detected or identified as low.
- 2.1.3 **Point of Entry:** In the majority of cases where entry points are known, offenders have entered licensed premises through external doors. Most commonly, doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and hand tools/implements. In a number of cases, glazing in doors and windows has been smashed by offenders to gain unauthorised access. Where the point of entry was legitimate/unknown, this is likely to have been when offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating, or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas.


2.1 Theft (Manchester Licenced Premises): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against licenced premises, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.

M/cr Licensed Premises Theft – Day Range



M/cr Licensed Premises Theft – Time Range




- 2.1.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester licensed premises peaks over the weekend. On these days, many premises within the city centre area experience higher levels of attendance than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunity for offenders to commit theft is greater.

- 2.1.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft peaks late at night and into the early morning. This reflects the times when licensed premises are at their busiest and therefore the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses/wallets, cash and phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items - usually stolen from table tops, from bags hung on chairs/stored under tables or via pickpocketing and distraction methods. Theft of property belonging to staff is also common, with offenders posing as legitimate customers to gain access to unauthorised areas.

2.2 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.



- 2.2.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at restaurants/cafés in Manchester fluctuates throughout the week, peaking on Monday, Thursday and Sunday.
- 2.2.2 **Time Range:** The risk of burglary peaks during the early hours of the morning, when premises are usually closed.
- 2.2.3 **Point of Entry:** In the majority of cases where entry points are known, offenders have entered Manchester restaurants/cafés through external doors. Doors have been forced open with bodily pressure and tools/implements and glazing within doors/windows has been smashed to gain entry. Offenders have also posed as legitimate customers before targeting insecure doors, tailgating, or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas when premises are open to the public.

2.3 Theft (Restaurants/Cafés): Risk Analysis


The data below relates to thefts within/against restaurants and cafés, recorded in the Manchester area during 2018 - 2019.




- 2.3.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester restaurants/cafes peaks over the weekend. Many premises experience higher levels of attendance at the weekend than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunities for offenders to commit theft is greater.
- 2.3.2 **Time Range:** The risk of theft peaks in the afternoon and into the evening. This reflects the times when restaurants/cafes are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to commit theft are greater. Handbags, purses/wallets and mobile phones belonging to customers are the most routinely stolen items. Offenders have also targeted I.T equipment within premises, particularly tablets and laptops, as well as alcohol from storage rooms.

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.4.1 **Day Range:** The risk of burglary at retail premises in Manchester peaks slightly on Wednesday, but remains relatively consistently high across the week.
- 2.4.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary peaks late at night and during in the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target commercial premises at these times when they are closed, it is dark and the areas in which they are typically located are quiet - all of which contribute to offenders perceiving a lower risk of being observed or detected.



2.4.3 **Point of Entry:** In burglaries at Manchester retail premises, the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through shutters, forcing them open by various means including using implements to force them upwards, using vehicles to ram them and using tools to cut through them.
- Offenders have also routinely forced open doors with bodily pressure and tools, as well as smashing glazed panels within them to gain unauthorised access.
- Windows have also been prised open or smashed by offenders.
- A high number of burglaries are recorded as having 'legitimate' or 'unknown' entry points. This is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers before targeting restricted/back-of-house areas (such as staff rooms, stock rooms etc.) unnoticed.
- Offenders have gained access to premises by gaining access through the roofs of single-storey elements or by penetrating through walls.

2.5 Theft (Manchester Retail): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against retail facilities, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.




2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester retail premises remains consistently high across the week. During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated in the afternoon and early evening. This is when retail premises are typically at their busiest and, therefore, the opportunities to offend are greater. The majority of thefts are either of staff property or of/from the handbags of shoppers (such as mobile phones, purses etc.). Theft of staff property are more likely to be noticed at

either midday, when lunch breaks are taken, or during the late afternoon when staff are leaving for the day.

2.6 Non-Domestic Burglary (Manchester Offices): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.6.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at office premises in Manchester is greatest on Tuesday, Thursday and Sunday.
- 2.6.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of burglary at Manchester office premises rises into the evening/late at night. Such premises are often targeted at these times when they are closed and unoccupied, meaning offenders can attempt to gain unauthorised access without fear of being disturbed or identified.
- 2.6.3 **Point of Entry:** The majority of burglaries at offices in Manchester have been committed through doors. Burglaries against office buildings in this area do not appear to be opportunistic, with offenders often bringing tools with them that can be used to force open doors and cut locks. Offenders have also smashed glazed panels in doors and windows to gain entry. A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through 'unknown' and 'legitimate' points of entry, which are likely to have been where offenders (posing as legitimate customers, visitors or employees) have gained unauthorised access to staff only areas (i.e. through insecure doors, tailgating etc.) to steal property.

2.7 Theft (Manchester Offices): Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against offices, recorded in the Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.7.1 **Day Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at Manchester offices is greatest on Monday and Tuesday and is generally lower over the weekend (when many are shut).
- 2.7.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk of theft is concentrated during normal working hours – peaking around midday. During these times, many office workers will take their lunch breaks, leaving unattended property at desks or in insecure areas. Thefts can also often happen at the end of the working day, when members of staff are finishing work and premises is likely to be less secure, such as while cleaning operations are carried out.


2.8 Non-Domestic Burglary (GM Leisure Facilities): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.



- 2.8.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of burglary at leisure facilities in the Greater Manchester area peaks on Thursday/Friday and is slightly lower on Saturday. During the day, the risk of burglary peaks during the late afternoon/early evening and during the early hours of the morning. During the late afternoon/early evening, leisure facilities are often at their busiest, meaning offenders can take advantage of busy staff and anonymity among higher numbers of legitimate customers. Offenders often target commercial properties at night, when they are often closed (or operate with a reduced number of on-site staff), it is dark and the streets/areas in which they are typically located are quieter than during the day – meaning offenders perceive a lower risk of being observed or detected.

GM Leisure Facilities Burglary – Point of Entry




2.8.2 **Point of Entry:** The following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently by offenders targeting leisure facilities:

- Doors and windows have been forced open by offenders using bodily pressure and implements.
- The glazing within doors and windows has been smashed to gain entry.
- Where the point of entry is 'legitimate' or 'unknown', this is likely to have been where offenders have posed as legitimate customers to gain access to premises when they are open, before targeting insecure doors, tailgating or using force to open internal doors to restricted areas without being noticed.


2.9 Theft (GM Leisure Facilities): Risk Analysis

The data below relates to thefts within/against leisure facilities (including leisure centres, sports centres and gyms), recorded in the Greater Manchester area 2018-2019.

GM Leisure Facilities Theft – Day Range





GM Leisure Facilities Theft – Time Range



2.9.1 **Day/Time Range:** During the week, the risk of theft at leisure facilities within the Greater Manchester area peaks on Tuesday, but remains consistently high throughout the week. During the day, the risk of theft rises in the afternoon and peaks in the evening. This is when leisure facilities are typically at their busiest and the opportunities to offend are greater. Personal property belonging to staff and customers, such as mobile phones and cash, are the most routinely targeted items – taking place most often in changing/locker rooms and staff-only areas.

2.10 Local Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site, between Feb 2021 & Jan 2022



2.10.1 **Day Range:** The risk of vehicle crime in the local area remains consistently high through the week, but peaks over the weekend.

2.10.2 **Time Range:** During the day, the risk rises in the afternoon and into the evening. It is likely that offenders target vehicles at these times when people park on streets and in public car parks in the area for long periods of time, while working in the area/in the city, shopping or attending nearby events/attractions. Vehicles parked on streets or within the numerous temporary car parks on vacant sites around the edges of the city centre (particularly when they are not staffed, have poor lighting levels and poor surface/boundary treatments), where they are easily accessible and cannot be easily overlooked by their owners, are often more vulnerable to attack than those parked within secure car parks/basement parking facilities. Offenders also often target vehicles in the evening when it is dark, streets/car parks are quiet and they perceive the risk of being observed and identified as low.

2.11 General Risk Factors

2.11.1 **Licensed Premises/Restaurants & Cafes:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery to business
- Criminal damage to property
- Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
- Miscellaneous theft to customers
- Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
- Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
- Violence towards staff
- Safety of staff personal belongings
- Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.11.2 **Retail:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Robbery
- Shoplifting
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work

- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Employee theft
- Loitering groups
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.11.3 **Offices:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Violence towards staff
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space
- Arson
- Cycle theft
- Employee theft
- Theft of/from parked vehicles
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.11.4 **Leisure:** The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Unauthorised access to non-public areas
- Criminal damage to property and vehicles
- Violence towards staff and other users
- Cycle security
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Controlled access (staff/user only)
- Tailgating (pedestrian and vehicular)
- Employee theft
- Theft of personal belongings at work
- Unauthorised access to buildings/private space

2.12 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

2.12.1 Having looked at the crime data for the proposed uses, the most frequent M.O's (modus operandi) used by offenders when targeting Manchester licenced premises, restaurants/cafes, retail premises, offices and Greater Manchester leisure facilities are listed below, along with suggested measures to reduce the risk of them being utilised at the proposed development:

- **Manchester Licensed Premises, Restaurant/Cafes, Retail, Offices & GM Leisure Facilities:** Doors have been forced open with tools/implements and bodily pressure

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements. Good use of perimeter boundaries (see Section 4.4), lighting (see Section 4.7) and CCTV (see Section 4.8) can also deter criminals by preventing access to vulnerable areas and increasing the chances of them being seen by security personnel or passers-by.

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- **Manchester Licensed Premises, Restaurant/Cafes, Offices & GM Leisure Facilities:** Glazing in doors and windows has been smashed to gain unauthorised access
Possible Solution – All new ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.1), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points.
 - **Manchester Licensed Premises, Restaurant/Cafes & GM Leisure Facilities:** Offenders posing as legitimate customers, gaining access to staff only areas to steal items
Possible Solution – There should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Sections 4.2).
 - **Manchester Licensed Premises, Restaurant/Cafes & Retail:** Theft of personal property from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables
Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats (see Section 5). The layout of any bars/restaurants/lounges can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment. External seating areas should be enclosed to clearly define them as separate from adjacent pedestrian routes.
 - **Manchester Retail:** A large proportion of burglaries have been committed through shutters, forcing them open by various means including using implements to force them upwards, using vehicles to ram them and using tools to cut through them
Possible Solution - Roller shutters can appear secure in that they are difficult to penetrate, however physical security products are only as strong as their weakest component. A security-certified shutter (see Section 4.1) has an independently proven level of resistance, and ensures that all aspects of the shutter (locks, rails, laths etc.) have been scrutinised by professionals. If external shutters are used, ideally the shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building to deter tampering/attack.
 - **Manchester Retail & GM Leisure Facilities:** Windows have also been prised open or smashed by offenders
Possible Solution - All external windows should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 4.1) where possible, which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. All ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.1), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. Vulnerable shopfronts should be secured with security-certified shutters out-of-hours. It may also be necessary for more windows to be fitted with bars, grilles or perforated metal/polycarbonate panels, in order to provide some additional protection.
 - **Manchester Retail:** Offenders have gained access to premises by gaining access through the roofs of single-storey elements or by penetrating through walls.
Possible Solution - Ideally, single storey building elements should be avoided. If they are absolutely necessary, care should be taken in their design to ensure that roof areas or upper floor windows are not accessible, for example, with the use of high-level/overhanging eaves, high balustrades etc. There should be no features of the building or any nearby hard/soft landscaping features that would facilitate climbing. Any 'accessible' skylights should incorporate at least one pane of laminated glazing and should be secured with internally fixed grilles/bars to prevent unauthorised access. The construction of the roof itself and all external walls should also be robust enough to withstand penetration.

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- **Manchester Offices:** Offenders posing as legitimate customers/visitors to gain access and steal items of personal property

Possible Solution – There should be robust access control systems in place to ensure that callers to the office building are vetted and/or met and escorted before being allowed access into them (see Section 4.2). All individual rooms should be capable of being secured when unoccupied and there should be secure areas for staff to store their belongings while at work. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed Development

- 3.1.1 The proposal is to change the use of the existing vacant industrial building to form a multi-use venue to be known as Diecast Beerhalle and Night Market, comprising of:
- **3,000 capacity Beer Hall & Open Kitchen** - to be located within the existing warehouse space to the west of the site and accessed via a main entrance off the external yard to the west (off Ducie Street). The space will incorporate 2 no. large bars, large beer brewing vessels, an open kitchen and food servery, a stage, long communal tables in the centre of the space, large capacity W/Cs and ground floor/mezzanine level back-of-house areas (including kitchen, wash up/prep room, cellar and staff room/offices).
 - **Night Market & 2,000 capacity Events Space** - to be located within the existing brick structure to the east of the site, accessed through the existing shuttered entrance off Ducie Street and internally through doors off the beer hall. The space will include stalls with bar and food serveries, W/Cs and a large storage area (with staff offices) at ground level, with a 1000 seat capacity event space with stage above at mezzanine level (also with some staff offices).
 - **150 capacity Bakery/Coffee/Tap Room & Wine Shop** - to be located at the south-west corner of the building, adjacent to the main beer hall entrance and accessed off Ducie Street. Including a servery and prep area and separated from the main hall with internal glass screens.
 - **1,000 capacity Garden & Terrace** - located within the existing yard to the west of the building, adjacent to the beer hall entrance and bakery/tap room, accessed off Ducie Street. The area will include a 20ft bar container and will provide a beer garden and al fresco dining, with long tables, seating around fire pits and covered tee-pee area for events.
 - **Creative & Innovation Offices and Studios** - located within the existing ground and mezzanine offices along the south elevation of the existing warehouse, accessed off Store Street and internally from the beer hall space. Will provide small flexible term office, workshop, studio spaces and meeting rooms for creative/tech companies.
 - **Retail/Commercial Units** - located along the Store Street elevation, with independent access off Store Street, as well as internally from the beer hall. Likely to house a plant shop, a barbers and a nail bar etc.
 - **Neighbourhood Gym** - located within the existing brick structure to the west of the site, accessed off Store Street.
- 3.1.2 In addition to these facilities, there will also be a 20 no. space cycle store (adjacent to the garden/terrace, accessed off Ducie Street), combined heat & power renewable energy generation and the existing car park accessed off Store Street will be retained (comprising or 20 no. e-bike charging spaces and 29 no. fully enabled fast charging parking bays).
- 3.1.3 The site will be open to the public 0800 to 0100, with 24 hour access to the proposed offices. Security staff will be on-site 24/7.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposal will bring back into use a currently vacant large building/site and will provide additional activity, natural surveillance and overlooking to the area, at all times of the day and into the evening/night.
- 3.2.2 The building will present an active frontage along Store Street, with external activity to the west (adjacent to Paradise Walk) - enlivening the street scene and helping to provide useful natural surveillance over the surrounding public realm.
- 3.2.3 The beer hall and night market will be served by a limited number of external entrances off Ducie Street, allowing security to be focussed on these locations and stewards to monitor arrival and departure from the venue. A crowd management plan for the beer hall has been prepared that covers planning,

guarding, security and safety, crowd management and emergency procedures for the operation of the beer hall and any events it hosts.

- 3.2.4 The interior of the premises will be capable of being 'zoned', allowing parts of the venue to be secured when not in use (e.g. secure the night market/events space when only the beer hall is in use). Back-of-house/staff only areas should also be capable of being secured to prevent unauthorised access.
- 3.2.5 The venue will be required to apply for a Premises Licence, which will include a comprehensive set of conditions designed to regulate any negative impact that the proposed uses of the building may otherwise bring. Adherence to the conditions set out in the Premises Licence and a Dispersal Policy will be essential to prevent/deter crime and disorder incidents and limit disturbance to local residents.
- 3.2.6 The building will be staffed by a security team, which will have a presence on-site 24/7, allowing for an immediate response to any incidents experienced.
- 3.2.7 Acoustic measures will be built into the building to minimise noise issues from the venue to local residents.
- 3.2.8 Part of the north, west and south elevations of the building are currently secured with high chain link fencing and vehicular gates - allowing the site to be enclosed out-of-hours (although these are not ideal from a security point of view - see below).
- 3.2.9 Public transport, including taxis, is easily accessible at Piccadilly Station to the west of the scheme.

3.3 Recommendations to Improve Security

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The existing chain link fencing enclosing the north, west and south of the building is not considered an effective secure boundary, as it can be easily scaled, cut or flexed to create gaps underneath or to aid climbing over (particular where there are large expanses that are not adequately braced/supported). It is highly recommended that the fencing is replaced with 2400mm high railings or rigid-panel, welded-wire mesh fencing and gates (see Section 4.4 for more information), to allow the site to be secured out-of-hours. The vehicular gates to the car park off Store Street should be secured between 0100 and 0800, with access restricted to unauthorised staff only.
- 3.3.2 Paradise Walk along the western boundary of the site is a narrow pedestrian route linking Ducie Street and Store Street that benefits from limited levels of activity, footfall, passive surveillance and direct overlooking - leaving legitimate users potentially isolated/vulnerable and allowing offenders to access/attack the site perimeter unseen. New fencing should be installed along the route, as described above, to ensure a secure boundary along the route. Given the proposed scheme is likely to result in the route being used more frequently than it is at present (particularly late at night), it is highly recommended that views over the route from the proposed garden/terrace are maximised (with any existing vegetation along the boundary removed or thinned) in order to improve views of and from the route. All external areas should be covered by a CCTV system monitored by on-site staff, ensuring there can be an immediate response to anyone attempting to gain unauthorised access out-of-hours (see Section 4.8 for more information).
- 3.3.3 The main external entrances to the beer hall and the night market/event space must be staffed with security personnel at busy periods/during events to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising. The entrances themselves should be clearly defined and well illuminated, with crowd control barriers to maintain order as customers queue. Provision should be made for electronic searching of customers to prevent weapons being taken into the premises when required. Similarly, provision should also be made for preventing customers entering the premises with controlled substances. Should the internal doors between the beer hall and the night market be utilised, they should also be monitored by door staff. All door/security staff engaged at the premises should be provided by an SIA ACS approved security company.
- 3.3.4 The multi-use nature of the proposed venue means that it is likely to be used by a number of different user groups at all times of the day and night. It is essential that the interior of the building is capable of being 'zoned', so that each area is capable of being secured while other areas are in use (e.g. securing the night market/events space when only the beer hall is in use). The internal doors between the beer hall and night market/events space, as well as the internal doors between the beer hall and the retail/commercial units should be capable of being secured when required (see Section 4.2 for more information). All internal doors to back-of-house/staff areas (such as kitchens, wash up/prep and cellar

rooms), offices and storage areas, as well as the internal doors between the creative/tech offices and the beer hall, should be access controlled to prevent unauthorised access (also see Section 4.2).

- 3.3.5 There should be a secure cash office (see Section 4.2), with a time delay safe securely fixed to the floor with a floor anchor. With that said, non-cash payment methods are preferred and should be encouraged. The night market stalls/kiosks should either be cleared at the end of an evening or should be capable of being secured out-of-hours (with no cash left within them). The bar containers within the night market area and the external garden/terrace should also be capable of being secured when not in use (see Section 4.5 for more information).
- 3.3.6 The external entrance lobby to the creative/tech offices should be staffed at all times when they are operational, who should have full surveillance of everyone entering/leaving the building. All visitors should report to reception for vetting by staff before gaining access to the offices, studios and meeting rooms. The entrance doors should be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff if required to prevent unauthorised access. All individual offices/suites should be capable of being secured when unoccupied. The internal access doors between the creative/tech offices and the beer hall should be access-controlled to prevent unauthorised access (see Section 4.2).
- 3.3.7 The proposed dedicated external entrances to the retail/commercial units along the Store Street frontage of the building should incorporate the appropriate physical security standards included within Section 4.1, in order to deter damage and prevent unauthorised access. The internal doors from the beer hall should also be to a secure standard to ensure they can be secured when not in use (see Section 4.2). Care should be taken with 'dual-fronted' retail/commercial units, as they can be difficult to manage and observe all customer access/egress. The staff/pay points should be appropriately located to ensure staff can easily observe both entrance/exit points, with any internal aisles or product displays aligned to assist surveillance and avoid blind-spots. It is also advised that there are no items of high-value displayed close to the entrances of the units.
- 3.3.8 The majority of thefts at gyms have occurred where offenders have gained access to the gym floor or changing rooms, before targeting property belonging to members. Access into the proposed gym of Store Street should be directly overlooked from a staffed reception desk or restricted to members only with the use of turnstiles that cannot be bypassed, an airlock/portal system or similar, to prevent non-members from gaining entry (see Section 4.2). Secure lockers must also be provided for all gym users and all back-of-house/staff-only areas should not be publicly accessible, with a secure area for staff to also store their belongings whilst at work.
- 3.3.9 Although it is noted that external alterations to the building will be limited, it is highly recommended that any new or replacement doorsets, shutters, windows and glazing are Secured by Design (SBD) standards - see Section 4.1 for more information. It is also highly recommended that any existing features of the industrial building that may aid an offender to gain access to the roof of the structure (e.g. ladders etc.) are removed or secured to prevent unauthorised access.
- 3.3.10 The operational hours of the venue should not conflict with nearby uses, particular where residential properties are in close proximity, as this can cause nuisance, conflict and generate police activity. The use of the external garden/terrace in particular should be closely monitored and controlled in the evening.
- 3.3.11 It is essential that the physical security measures listed below are incorporated where appropriate into the scheme. Integrated, risk-commensurate security measures aim to place secure physical barriers or surveillance in the path of the criminal – making crime harder to commit and raising the risk of detection and possible capture, as well as promoting a feeling of safety in staff and customers.

4 Physical Security

4.1 Any External Alterations

It is strongly recommended that any external alterations to be carried out as part of the proposed scope of works, or in the future, should incorporate the following physical security measures:

- ☐ Any new external doorsets (including single-leaf, double-leaf, sliding or bi-folding) should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. Escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.
- ☐ Any new windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing (see below) and should be securely fixed.
- ☐ Any new shutters should be certified to LPS 1175 SR2 and installed in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. Where shutters are to be externally mounted, shutter boxes and guides should be built into the fabric of the building where possible, where they would be less visually intrusive and less vulnerable to damage. Consideration could also be given to anti-vandal screens to replace any existing window grilles, which would protect any vulnerable areas of glazing at all times of the day and night (e.g. <http://www.securityshutters.co.uk/Anti-Vandal-Screens.php>).
- ☐ Any new glazing should incorporate an inner pane with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The outer pane should be a minimum of 6mm toughened or have no less than a 0.8mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 6.8mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P2A under EN 356 (see Section 7.1 for more information). The glass should be well held in suitable gaskets in 35mm rebates or be in at least 30mm rebates if held in well bedded clamped gaskets or, preferably, bonded with silicon or polysulphide sealant.
- ☐ Any existing ladders/features that may aid climbing and unauthorised access to the roof of the building should be removed or secured to deter unauthorised access.

4.2 Internal Security & Access Controls

- ☐ The internal doors/frames between the beer hall and the night market/events space should be robust/solid core (minimum 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and a robust multi-point locking system to allow them to be secured when either space is not in use.
- ☐ All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work. Internal access doors/frames leading to the back-of-house staff areas serving the beer hall (including the kitchen, wash up/prep room, the cellar and the staff room) should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and fitted with either auditable access controls (i.e. proximity readers or swipe cards). Doors to any offices, storage areas or plant areas serving the beer hall or night market/event space (as well as any dressing rooms/tech support rooms) should be solid-core (min. 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and key operated locks to secure them when unoccupied/when access is not required. Mezzanine level staff areas should not be accessible to the public and the events space at mezzanine level should be capable of being secured when not in use.
- ☐ There should be a secure cash office, which should have solid masonry walls (with no adjacent false/suspended ceilings), a doorset certified to BS PAS 24 and a time delay safe providing adequate capacity and overnight cover. The cash office should contain a telephone and a mobile phone with a clear signal. The correct size and category of safe should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance needs. Chute deposit safes (certified to LPS 1183) should be located behind each of the large bar/servery areas, or an alternative management practice should be utilised which would reduce the amount of cash held in the tills during busy periods. Non-cash methods of payment should be encouraged. The installation of a 'drug' safe may also be appropriate (to safely store confiscated controlled substances). This should have two keys - one held by Police and one by the premises supervisor. Both keys should be required to empty the safe and deposits can be made

without a key. A formal protocol between operators and Greater Manchester Police will need to be put in place to manage such a facility.

- ☐ The creative/tech office premises should have a staffed reception desk adjacent to the main external entrance and all visitors should report to the reception for vetting by staff before gaining access. The main entrance doors should be capable of being controlled remotely by reception staff when required (e.g. into the evening/at night) to prevent unauthorised access. Outside of normal working hours or if the premises are to be open at any time without reception staff within the entrance lobby area, the entrance door should be controlled by staff key-fob/card and by means of a video access control system linked to a security office or to each individual office suite, allowing staff to vet visitors before allowing them access. Internal doors/frames to individual offices, suites or meeting rooms should be solid core (minimum 44mm thick), with 3 hinges and a key-operated lock, so that they can be secured when unoccupied. Any internal entrances off the beer hall should be security-certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2, self-closing and operated by staff key-fob/card only - preventing unauthorised access.
- ☐ The new external entrance doors to the bakery/tap room and the retail/commercial units along Store Street should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2 (with any glazing laminated - see Section 4.1 above). Any internal doors off the beer hall should also be to the same standard, to allow them to be secured when required.
- ☐ The new main entrance to the gym should be security-certified and controlled by reception staff, by turnstiles (that cannot be easily by-passed) or by a portal/airlock system (allowing one person to gain access at a time, eliminating the potential for tailgating), operated by membership card. Swipe card or proximity readers are a more secure method of entry, rather than key code entry (which can be observed by others). Membership cards should be capable of being easily/quickly activated or disabled by staff. If key code entry must be used, key codes should be unique to each member, code entry should not be capable of being observed by others and there must be robust controls in place to ensure that key codes are only used by authorised members. To mitigate the risk of theft, lockers should be provided for the use of gym users, ideally with clear views of them from the main workout areas to increase the chances of any offenders attempting to force open lockers being seen. The lockers themselves must be robust/secure and all visitors must be encouraged to use them and not leave belongings unattended. Staff should undertake regular inspections of all areas of the facility, including any changing facilities and the locker areas. Internal access doors/frames to any back-of-house areas or equipment stores should be
- ☐ Internal walls between units/areas should either be formed by robust masonry, laminated glazed screens or should incorporate timber sheathing (minimum 9mm thick) or expanded metal, in order to ensure that the walls themselves are not vulnerable to attack/penetration.
- ☐ Staff should only be allowed access to areas required for their work. Any electric locking system to be used throughout the building should be fully auditable (i.e. allows the retention of data, such as who accessed where and when), to allow for a better investigation into any incidents. Any access control cards/fobs should be capable of being easily and quickly activated/disabled to ensure that mis-use is prevented. Keys/passes should only be carried if required for duties and should be accounted for at all times. The use of numeric keypad locks are not advised, as codes can be easily observed or shared and are rarely changed.

4.3 Alarm

- ☐ A comprehensive intruder alarm system should be installed to cover the building (or each individual unit/use if they can be independently secured), linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (i.e. linked to the on-site security team or an Alarm Receiving Centre).
- ☐ The alarm system should incorporate personal attack buttons for the use of staff in identified locations, such as behind bars/serveries, at main entrance/ticket desks on entry and in the cash office.

4.4 Boundaries

- ☐ The chainlink fencing/gates enclosing the north, west and south of the building should be replaced with 2400mm high railings or high-security, rigid-panel, welded-wire mesh fencing and gates (please see <https://www.securedbydesign.com/member-companies/accredited-product-search> for a list of Police approved perimeter security suppliers). The fenceline should be returned to the south-west corner of the building, ensuring all access to the garden/terrace area and the beer hall main entrance is off Ducie Street. Care should be taken to ensure that panels are fixed securely to the posts (preventing tampering/removal) and that any level changes do not inadvertently facilitate climbing or leave large gaps underneath the panels/gates.
- ☐ The vehicular gate/s to the car park off Store Street should be secured and controlled via staff key fob/proximity reader between 0100 and 0800. A sliding gate is preferred, but if double gates are used they should overlap when closed and should not be capable of being forced open. The manual entrance gates off Ducie Street should also be secured at night/out-of-hours. Exposed hinges and large sliding bolt apertures/locking points to any gates should be avoided, or fitted with shrouding/protective plates (see opposite) to avoid the creation of footholds. The gap at the bottom of any gates should be small enough to stop anyone crawling through. If panic mechanisms are required on the inner face of any pedestrian gates (for escape purposes), they should not be capable of being reached/operated from the external face of the fence/gate.
- ☐ Care should be taken to ensure there are no trees or any other hard/soft landscaping features immediately adjacent and on the publicly accessible side of any secure boundaries that could be used as a climbing aid to scale the fencing. Any such features should be pruned or removed where possible. The site boundary treatment should also be positioned on hard standing ground. Where this is not possible, the ground conditions should be reviewed as extra measures may be required to create a secure boundary.
- ☐ It is highly recommended that condition of the fencing along the perimeter of the site is regularly inspected for signs of damage/attack and is repaired immediately if any incidents are experienced.



4.5 Bar Containers & Any Market Kiosks

- ☐ Any shipping container bars/serveries to the external garden/terrace area and the night market should be of robust steel construction, ideally with internal hinges to any openings, recessed lock boxes (preventing access to locks) and door bolts top and bottom to opening leafs. They should be secured with container locks or padlocks to CEN Insurance Grade 4 or Sold Secure rating Silver/Gold. There should be no cash or high value items left within containers overnight.
- ☐ If any stalls/kiosks within the night market are to be permanent (i.e. items for sale will be stored on-site when closed), they should be capable of being secured out-of-hours. They should ideally be of steel construction or should incorporate expanded metal or welded-mesh into the wall/roof construction or behind any cladding, to prevent access through the building fabric. Doors and shutters should be security-certified (see Section 4.1). Again, no cash should be stored within any such kiosks overnight.

4.6 Car Park

- ☐ The car park should be secured with a vehicular gate/s controlled via staff key fob/proximity reader outside of normal working hours or at least between 0100 and 0800 (see Section 4.4), in order to prevent mis-use and unauthorised vehicles getting close to the building out-of-hours.
- ☐ Any pay machines should be located in busy and well-overlooked areas, so as to maximize surveillance over them, and not secluded areas where they cannot easily be monitored or where a potential offender could conceal themselves nearby. Non-cash payment and pre-payment methods should be encouraged. Any such machines should be emptied frequently (and signed as such), alarmed, protected by anti-ram bollards and covered by CCTV.

- ☐ Lighting to the car park should be in accordance with BS 5489, with an average lux level 20 and a uniformity level of no less than 25%.
- ☐ The surface of the car park should be even tarmac. The integrity of the surface treatment should be maintained to ensure that there is no loose material that can be used to commit crime.
- ☐ Bays and directional markings should be clearly demarcated to avoid confusion or conflict, with pedestrian routes/directions clearly signed. Traffic calming measures should be incorporated to limit the speed of vehicles within the site.

4.7 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting should be provided to all access routes, parking areas and external seating areas within the site, in accordance with BS 5489.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors and shutters.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. LED, metal halide or bulbs with a comparable output should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Lighting fixtures must not be positioned to provide climbing aids over boundary treatments or climbing aids onto roof areas or up to high level windows. Electrical and architectural layouts should be developed together to avoid this.
- ☐ Internal lighting should be controlled from behind bars or in a security/management room, away from public access. Zoned dimmers should be used to increase the control of areas from the bar/management office. An override should be provided, within easy reach of security staff, so that if an incident occurs the lighting level can be raised. This will also help at the end of an event so that staff can see to clear up, and patrons have no doubt that it is closing time and they should make their way out of the premises. The lighting override can also be linked to music controls so that, in the event of an incident, music can be turned off immediately as well as lighting increased.

4.8 CCTV

Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an *Acceptable Standard* that will allow for *Identification* of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are *Overview* and *Recognition*, which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

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- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [all entrances to the site and the building](#), [all external elevations](#), [all vehicle/cycle parking areas](#), [all internal circulation areas](#), [all sales counters/till positions](#) and [all internal and external seating areas](#).
 - ☐ The proposed CCTV system should be capable of being monitored by the 24/7 on-site security team, so there can be an immediate response to any incidents being recorded. It is also highly recommended that there is a linked public address facility, to inform any offenders who attempt to gain access out-of-hours that have been detected on site, that they are being monitored/recorded and that the police have been called.

4.9 Garden Terrace Area & Landscaping

- ☐ Any easily removable tables and chairs, canopies, heaters or screens/barriers should be stored within the premises out-of-hours, in order to prevent damage or mis-use and prevent the space from fostering loitering/gathering, nuisance/anti-social behaviour and mis-use when the premises are closed. Any awnings should also be retracted out-of-hours.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' (see Section 5) to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats.
- ☐ The success of the external seating area is largely dependent on the effective management of the space, particularly at peak times. Staff should closely monitor customer use/behaviour and should regularly clear away used crockery/cutlery to prevent theft or mis-use.
- ☐ Any landscape features (hard or soft) to the garden/terrace area should not impede natural surveillance off/from the building, Ducie Street/Paradise Walk or reduce the effectiveness of lighting (see Section 4.7) or any CCTV system (see Section 4.8).
- ☐ Any existing or proposed vegetation around the garden/terrace area and the street frontages of the building/car park should not exceed approx. 1000mm in height and tree canopies should fall no lower than approx. 2000mm from the ground. This is in order to allow people to see their surroundings better and eliminate hiding places. A maintenance agreement should stipulate that these planting dimensions would be adhered to.
- ☐ Loose surface materials in publicly accessible areas of the scheme should be avoided. Small fragments of ground covering can be used as missiles against people and premises (both to gain entry and to commit criminal damage).
- ☐ Planting must be avoided that will aid climbing over boundary treatments. The security of fences can be compromised if trees or street furniture are placed close by.

4.10 Other

- ☐ Any external cycle parking areas should be located where they can be well-overlooked from routinely occupied rooms within the building or from external seating areas. They should also be covered by a monitored CCTV system (see Section 4.8). Any cycle store should include 'Sheffield' type stands, which both wheels and the crossbar can be locked to rather than just the crossbar (wheel slots and butterfly racks are not suitable). For further information, please refer to our cycle storage guidance document: <http://designforsecurity.org/all-downloads/>. Any gates to secure cycle stores should be self-closing/locking, with locks operated by fobs or keys issued to staff or authorised members of a cycle parking scheme.
- ☐ Any external bin/recycling stores should be secure, lockable and fire resistant enclosures. A strategy should be defined to ensure waste collection can take place whilst retaining a secure development.

5 Internal Layout Guidance

The internal layout of licensed premises, cafes & restaurants and events spaces should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. It is highly recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, so as not to undermine the security of the building shell.

5.1.1 Licensed premises, cafes & restaurants and events spaces can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

- Opportunities - Large numbers of people congregating in such premises generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
- Lack of attention - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
- Cohesion – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent such premises means that such a venue would lack 'community territoriality' (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
- Customer turnover – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
- Valuable goods – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys etc.
- Stealth - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.


5.1.2 The incidence and severity of disorder issues in large licensed/event venues and their environs are often linked to physical features of these locations, such as:

- High concentration of people;
- Crowd congestion;
- Services that do not cater for demand, i.e. insufficient serving staff;
- Physical hazards arising from type and placement of furniture/ancillary structures; and
- Insufficient and unclean toilets.

In order to minimise these issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles are adhered to:

- 5.1.3 The main entrances to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.
- 5.1.4 Customers entering/leaving the premises should be easily observed by staff. Staff should also have clear views of any W/Cs to monitor their use.
- 5.1.5 The internal layout of premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.
- 5.1.6 Consideration should be given to high/wide bars/service counters, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aid surveillance of all parts of the premises. Tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of any bars/service counters should be prevented (e.g. with lockable doors or hatches that cannot be easily scaled). Sufficient levels of service staff should be provided at busy periods to reduce waiting times and the potential for frustration, aggression and conflict.
- 5.1.7 All back-of-house/staff areas should not be publicly accessible (see Section 4.2) and there should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings whilst at work.

- 5.1.8 It is highly recommended that any customer tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see below).



- 5.1.9 Adequate signage should be deployed to direct people throughout the venue, but also to deter unauthorised access to staff-only/back-of-house areas.

- 5.1.10 Public toilets can give rise to crime and disorder issues and the following issues should be considered:

- Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
- Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
- Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
- Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
- Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
- Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.

6 Management & Maintenance

- 6.1.1 The success of the proposal will be dependent on effective management of the premises and a zero tolerance policy should be adopted with customers who behave inappropriately. Comprehensive risk assessments should be carried out in advance of all events/uses, in order to identify and address potential security issues.
- 6.1.2 During events, the control of people entering the venue will be essential to maintaining order, both inside and outside the premises. Strict monitoring of numbers entering the venue must be undertaken, as overcrowding inside will facilitate criminal activity. Management of people awaiting entry will also be important, in order to prevent frustrations building up that could create disorder. The pavement outside the night market/events space entrance on Ducie Street is not particularly wide and care must be taken to avoid creating obstacles for other pedestrians or vehicles. Signage will assist in directing people to appropriate queuing locations, but sufficient security staff will be needed to supervise the entry process and an outside security presence will be required at busy times.
- 6.1.3 Security staff should also ensure the swift and safe dispersal of visitors away from the venue after an event. Trained security staff should be positioned at the exits and entrances to site as visitors leave. Suitable notices should be displayed on all exits from the site advising visitors to keep noise to a minimum when leaving the venue.
- 6.1.4 All door/security staff engaged at the premises should be provided by an SIA ACS approved security company. Security staff should regularly patrol the entire site to ensure a visible presence to visitors and potential offenders.
- 6.1.5 The setting up, dismantling and operational processes involved in events can provide many opportunities for criminal activity, as an offender can act anonymously within the relatively transient community of temporary workers/delivery personnel, and gain access to otherwise secure areas. It is therefore essential that effective identification and verification procedures are put in place for the whole period of events.
- 6.1.6 The applicant should engage in dialogue with the local neighbourhood policing team in central Manchester and should give advance notice of events, so that appropriate policing arrangements can be made - Tel: 0161 856 3221, Email: citycentre@gmp.police.uk
- 6.1.7 A comprehensive security regime for the management of the venue must be prepared and remain in place for the day-to-day running of the building. There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations. The operating/maintenance plan should focus on issues such as:
- Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure;
 - Cash management within the premises - including a chute deposit safe behind any bar/till area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods;
 - Cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
 - Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
 - Details of staff security training;
 - Location and management of any smoking areas;
 - Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. fencing, access controls, alarm systems, CCTV cameras etc;
 - Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti and litter (regular litter patrols should be carried out inside and outside the premises, to prevent discarded bottles, glasses, cans etc. from being used to cause criminal damage or used as weapons); and
 - Refuse collection arrangements (which should not require bins to be left accessible for extended periods).

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- 6.1.8 The opening hours of the venue should be consistent with other such premises in the locale and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses.
 - 6.1.9 Any high value equipment (e.g. computers/TVs, music/DJ equipment, tools etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
 - 6.1.10 Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the premises, but also to deter unauthorised access to back-of-house/staff-only areas.

7 Construction

- 7.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 7.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to.

8 Useful References

8.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 8.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact Register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
1 st February 2022	Deloitte	Receipt of CIS instruction form
3 rd February 2022	Deloitte	Quote issued & request for proposed plans/additional information
3 rd to 15 th February 2021	Deloitte	Email/telephone correspondence re: fee
15 th February 2022	Deloitte	Confirmation of instruction/fee
15 th February 2022	Deloitte	Receipt of site plan. No D&A available. Request for additional info
23 rd February 2022	Deloitte	Receipt of crowd management plan/draft consultation document
28 th to 1 st February 2022	Deloitte	Email correspondence re: timescales
9 th to 15 th March 2022	Deloitte	Email correspondence & receipt of floorplans/elevations and additional info
21 st March 2022	Deloitte	Email sent to Agent re: report completion & payment
21 st to 22 nd March 2022	Swan Street Firehouse	Email correspondence re: invoice
23 rd March 2022	GMP Finance Dept	Confirmation of payment

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
343-01	Existing Site Plan	Feb 2021	-
343-200	Proposed Site Plan (SUPERSEDED)	19/01/21	D
343-02	Proposed Site Plan	14/03/22	C
343-400	Proposed GF Plan	Mar 2022	-
343-401	Proposed Mezzanine Plan	Mar 2022	-
343-402	Proposed Internal Elevations	Mar 2022	-
-	Crowd Management Plan	02/02/22	1.1
	Draft Consultation Document 'The Foundry - A Creative Neighbourhood in Manchester'	-	-

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 24

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for doorsets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

BS EN 1627 (Security Ratings RC1 to RC6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in BS EN 1627 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing*
- b) Performance of hardware*
- c) Resistance to static loading*
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading*
- e) Burglary resistance by manual intervention*

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS 201

Enhanced security requirements for doorsets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS 24

STS 202

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding doorsets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS 1175.

BS EN 356 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstdesign.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk