



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

1 Salmon Street

Development of 16m² Offices, 39m²
Café/Retail and 126m² Bar/Leisure

For: Salmon Street MCR LTD

VERSION A: 22/02/19

Reference: 2019/0141/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

1 Salmon Street

2019/0141/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Minor security additions/design changes required

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime.

The layout of the proposed scheme is considered acceptable, as long as the issues discussed in more detail within Section 3.3 of this report are addressed, which includes:

- Control of access into/around the bar– including access controls to main entrance out-of-hours.
- Staff back-of-house areas.
- Single main entrance.

If these issues can be addressed as described within the report and the other physical security measures are incorporated, I would be happy to support the development.

Please note: Greater Manchester Police Design for Security will recommend to the local planning authority that a planning condition is added that reflects the physical security specification listed within Sections 4 & 5 of this report.



David Maher *Dip Arch*

Design for Security Consultant

Contents

1	Visual Audit.....	4
2	Crime Statistics & Analysis.....	Error! Bookmark not defined.
	2.1 Crime Overview	
	2.2 Non-domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis	
	2.3 Miscellaneous Theft: Risk Analysis	
	2.4 Risk Factors	
	2.5 Crime Summary	
3	Layout Appraisal.....	8
	3.1 Proposed development	
	3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal	
	3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations	
4	Physical Security	10
	4.1 Doors	
	4.2 Windows	
	4.3 Glazing	
	4.4 Alarms	
	4.5 Boundaries	
	4.6 Landscaping	
	4.7 Lighting	
	4.8 Car parking	
	4.9 CCTV	
	4.10 Other	
5	Management & Maintenance	Error! Bookmark not defined.
6	Construction	14
7	Useful References	15
	7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)	

Appendix

A	Contact register	16
B	Associated Documents.....	16
C	CIS Version History	16
D	Glossary	17

1 Visual Audit

The development site is indicated by the red outline on the plan adjacent and is supported with existing site context photographs taken around the site.

The site is located on Salmon St sandwiched between two existing buildings; Hare & Hounds PH & Cut in Time barbers. The site is accessed from Salmon St.

The site is currently accessible for vehicles parking on Salmon Street.





The site is well connected to the public transport system. The nearest tram stop is Shudehill, approx. 100m due West. Shudehill contains a busy transport interchange for buses and trams alongside a multi-storey car park.

The proposed development site is currently being renovated.

The site is located in the busy and popular district of the city centre known as the Northern Quarter. This area contains a mix of commercial businesses, retail uses, café/bars, restaurants and residential uses. The night-time economy within this area is a popular destination across the week & weekend.

Over the last decade the Northern Quarter has undergone a distinct redevelopment of the heritage buildings and urban environment. A number of surrounding areas are currently undergoing huge redevelopment, NOMA, Victoria train station, Angel meadows & the New Cross area & Rochdale Rd corridor.

It was evident that parts of Salmon St is/has been used for rough sleeping and drug taking.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st February 2018 to 31st January 2019.

2.1 Crime Summary

Figure 1: Recorded Crime within 500m of Site

Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
46	229	309	1878	1032	485	52	280	45	197

- 2.1.1 The most frequently occurring offences over the previous 12 months in the local area have been less serious wounding, theft and robbery. These types of crime are typical of those experienced in or within close proximity of district, town or city centres – where there is often a concentration of retail, commercial and licensed premises, leading to a concentration of crime and disorder issues. The majority of the violence in the local area has taken place in the evening and during early hours of the morning, with a higher volume of incidents typically experienced between Friday and Sunday – when more people visit the city and attend licensed premises (often for longer periods and consuming more alcohol).

2.2 Common Use-Specific M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Opening of secured doors and windows using bodily force or implements to gain entry.

Possible Solution - All external doors should be certified to recognised security standards (see Section 5.1), which are independently proven to reduce the risk of forced entry and thus increase the chances of detection. Security-certified doors are the best long-term measure to address this risk and can be obtained to suit virtually all operational requirements.

- 2.2.2 Smashing glazing in windows and doors to gain entry.

Possible Solution – All new ground floor/accessible glazing (including in and around doors) should include a laminated pane (see Section 4.3), which forms a much more robust barrier against shattering and penetration. The strength of the laminated glass should be relative to the strength of the door or window system in which it is fitted. Where possible, the size of any glazed elements within/directly adjacent to doors should be reduced and set well away from locking points. In vulnerable locations, shutters, grilles or perforated protective panels may be necessary to provide extra protection.

- 2.2.3 Theft of personal property from table tops or from bags hung on chairs or stored under tables.

Possible Solution – Consideration should be given to tables and chairs designed to facilitate secure storage of belongings or adapted with 'Chelsea Clips' to reduce the opportunities to steal bags/coats (see Section 5). The layout of the premises can also help deter occurrences and increase surveillance opportunities. It should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding any pinch points or areas of concealment.

- 2.2.4 Offenders posing as legitimate customers, gaining access to staff only areas.

Possible Solution – here should be a secure area for staff to store their belongings while at work and all staff-only, back-of-house areas should be secured to prevent unauthorised public access (see Section 5.1).

2.3 Risk Factors




The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Burglary
- Cash robbery
- Loitering groups/Anti-social behaviour
- Robbery to business

-
- Criminal damage to property
 - Alcohol-fuelled violence/conflict
 - Miscellaneous theft to customers
 - Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour
 - Conflict of use with neighbouring venues
 - Violence towards staff
 - Safety of staff personal belongings
 - Robbery/wounding of patrons leaving premises
 - Theft and criminal damage during the construction period

2.4 Non-Domestic Burglary Retail & Licence: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to non-domestic burglary offences within/against Retail & Licence, recorded in the Manchester area.





2.4.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of burglary is highest in the late evening into the early morning throughout the week, in particularly Tuesday and Friday

2.4.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:

- Opening of secure doors and windows using bodily pressure and implements to gain access.
- Exploitation of insecure doors and windows to gain access to the premises.
- Posing as legitimate customers to gain access to restricted areas.
- Forcing open secure shutters using implements/tools.
- Smash glazing in door and window to gain access to premises.

2.5 Theft Retail & Licence: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to thefts within/against Retail & Licence, recorded in the Manchester area.



- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of theft is highest in the early hours of the morning on Saturday and Sunday. On these days many premises within the city centre area experience higher levels of attendance than during the week. Premises are also usually open for longer at the weekend and so the opportunity for offenders to commit theft is greater.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime is highest in the afternoons and evenings, in particular on Saturday and Sunday.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is located at 1 Swan Street, in the Northern Quarter of Manchester City Centre.
- 3.1.2 The proposed development is for licensed premises at first floor and retail coffee bar at ground level.
- 3.1.3 The existing glazing and entrance will be replaced with new powder coated aluminium glazing systems. New fascia and name boards will replace the existing.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The proposal will present active frontages to the street, enlivening the street scene and helping to provide useful natural surveillance over the surrounding public realm currently lacking to this particular corner.
- 3.2.2 The entire building is being completely renovated and refreshed.
- 3.2.3 The glazed façades of the ground floor will also offer a greater level of artificial light onto the street/public realm.
- 3.2.4 The main entrance to the ground floor premises will be located in a prominent position and will be capable of being clearly seen from the public realm and the staffed bar area.
- 3.2.5 The footprint of the internal space is simple, with no accessible doors/windows hidden within deep recesses or behind building lines (where they would be vulnerable to attack unseen).
- 3.2.6 The proposed development provides the opportunity to include security features built into the design and construction of the premises and avoid the need for obtrusive retro-fitted security measures that can increase the fear of crime. Security measures carefully incorporated into the design can ensure the buildings are reasonably secure, without visibly announcing that the design was concerned about crime.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 It would be beneficial to run a cashless business, with all payments taken by card – leaving the premises less vulnerable to cash robbery.
- 3.3.2 Currently the main entrance is located on Swan St. It is essential to use only one entrance to a premises in order to ensure adequate control and monitoring to patrons entering the building.
- 3.3.3 Bars: in particular if poorly managed, can generate crime:
 - 1. Large numbers of people congregating in one place generates opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons of bars/restaurants are stationary for long periods of time making them easier to target.
 - 2. The movement of people, noise, social interaction, and levels of intoxication mean patrons are less vigilant in the care of their personal belongings.
 - 3. Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent premises means that such a venue would lack 'community territoriality', i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them. This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur in the venue where there is a 'regular' clientele.
 - 4. High customer turnover bars/restaurants, with high levels of customer movement within the establishment are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.

5. Valuable goods (mobile phones, wallets, purses, etc.) are very often available and on show, a particular problem on external seating areas, although that is not an issue with this proposal.
6. Poorly arranged waste disposal can lead to arson. Unsecured bins placed on the highway or in accessible rear areas have been targeted in the city centre in the past, if the bins are very close to a building this can have very serious consequences.

3.3.4 In order to minimise the above issues, it is recommended that the following good practice principles should be adhered to:

- The entrance to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising.
- Customers entering/leaving the premises through the entrance should be easily observed by staff. Staff should always have a clear view of the entrance door and stairs via a CCTV system.
- The back-of-house area must not be accessible to the public.
- There should be secure lockers for staff to store their belongings whilst at work located in a private room within the premises.
- A secure room, with a time delay safe, so that staff can count the takings out of public gaze and store cash overnight.
- A chute deposit safe (certified to LPS 1183) should be located behind the bar area, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
- The design of the bar itself should ensure that it is elevated high or wide, which increase the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons, and aids surveillance of all parts of the floor.
- Tills should front customers as they enable staff to maintain vision of the serving area and beyond. (Ideally, fit tills below the bar or protected with screening to prevent snatches).
- Casual access to the rear of service counters should be prevented (e.g. with a lockable hatch).
- The internal layout the premises should be generally uncluttered, allowing clear views of all spaces and avoiding pinch points. A clear pathway to and from the entrance/exit and the toilets to the seating areas is required.
- Service areas should be secured at all times.

3.3.5 With the above in mind, an 'operating policy' should be drawn up which includes:

- security (door policy; door staff; staff training; CCTV cameras - monitoring and recording facilities, and their locations; and cash storage/management);
- fire safety, including clearing the designated escape route of all obstacles;
- dispersal procedure; and,

3.3.6 Servicing and waste management (in a secure location), avoiding the disposal of glass late at night which might disturb any nearby residents.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 External Doors



Any new external doors should be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS 202 or LPS 1175 SR2.

-
- ☐ It is crucial that the door ironmongery to any external escape-only doors is permitted under the security certification of the product. Escape-only doors should be alarmed (audible upon opening) and designed without visible external ironmongery.

4.2 Windows & Shutters

- ☐ All new windows, where possible, should be certificated to BS PAS 24. All other window designs/dimensions should take account of the requirements of the above standards, as certified products can carry dimensional restrictions. Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed.
- ☐ The glazed frontages of the arches should be secured with shutters certified to LPS 1175 SR2 (or SR1 if perforated laths are required), which should be installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Any external shutters should have shutter boxes and guides built into the fabric of the building, where they would be less visually intrusive and less vulnerable to damage or being forced open.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ All new glazing must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ If possible, any fully glazed arches should be protected anti-ram bollards or other similar hard/soft landscaping features to deter such an attack. If this is not possible, it is recommended that the frontages have re-enforced stall risers. There should be bollards or a vehicle arm barrier installed in front of the storage & distribution roller shutter door.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall (or material of similar strength e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind any cladding to the arches, to a minimum height of 2000mm from external ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack. Any external louvered panels should be robustly constructed and fixed, to ensure they cannot be easily removed, and designed to ensure that they cannot be used as a climbing aid. Security-certified louvered doorsets are also available if required (e.g. <http://www.securedbydesign.com/members/premier-ss-ltd/>).

4.4 Internal Layout & Security

4.4.1 Bars and restaurants can, if poorly managed, generate crime for the following reasons:

- **Opportunities** - Large numbers of people congregating in premises, generating opportunities for crime. Unlike on-street populations, patrons are stationary for long periods of time, making them easier to target.
- **Lack of attention** - The movement of people, noise, social interaction and other factors mean patrons can be easily distracted.
- **Cohesion** – Particularly during busy periods, the large numbers and wide variety of groups of people that tend to frequent such premises means that such a venue would lack 'community territoriality' (i.e. regular customers displaying an awareness of and care for the environment around them). This can limit any self-policing that might otherwise occur.
- **Customer turnover** – High turnover with high levels of customer movement within an establishment, are more likely to allow offenders to go unnoticed.
- **Valuable goods** – Often available and possibly on show, a particular problem in external seating areas. Patrons are likely to carry small, valuable, concealable goods – such as mobile phones, purses, wallets, keys etc.
- **Stealth** - Busy venues provide the anonymity necessary to commit offences.

4.4.2 The internal security and layout of the premises should be carefully considered, so as to maximise surveillance over customers and reduce the opportunities for criminals to exploit. It is highly

recommended that the following good practice principles are adopted where applicable, in order to minimise the issues highlighted above:

- ☐ The main entrance to the premises must be effectively managed at busy periods to control numbers, ensure safe access/egress and avoid potential conflicts arising. Customers entering/leaving the premises should be easily observed by staff. Multiple entry points should be avoided if possible, but must be individually staffed if required
- ☐ All door staff employed at the premises should be provided by an SIA ACS approved door security company and should wear easily identifiable clothing, both when inside and outside the premises.
- ☐ A smoking area should be defined and clearly demarcated and a procedure for allowing smokers to re-enter the premises should be set out in the operating procedures for the venue.
- ☐ If cash is taken at the premises, there should be a secure cash office – which should have solid masonry walls (with no adjacent false/suspended ceilings), a doorset certified to BS PAS 24 and a safe providing adequate capacity and overnight cover. The correct size and category of safe should be determined by an assessment of prospective takings and to meet insurance needs. Consideration should also be given to chute deposit safes (certified to LPS 1183) behind the bar areas, or an alternative management practice, which would reduce the amount of cash held in tills during busy periods.
- ☐ Internal access doors/frames to all other offices, cellar/store rooms, package/distribution spaces, kitchens, staff facilities etc. should also be solid-core (min. 44mm thick) and fitted with auditable access controls (i.e. proximity readers or swipe cards) or secured with key operated locks (carried by staff only if required for duties and accounted for at all times) to secure them when unoccupied. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and should be trained to be vigilant and to report any suspicious behaviour.
- ☐ Consideration should be given to high bars/service counters, which increases the distance between staff and any potentially aggressive patrons and aids surveillance of all parts of the premises. Any tills should be positioned away from customers' reach, but preferably fronting towards customers. Casual access to the rear of the bars/service counters should be prevented (e.g. with a lockable hatch that cannot be easily scaled). Sufficient levels of service staff should be provided at busy periods to reduce waiting times and the potential for frustration, aggression and conflict.
- ☐ Staff should have clear views of the W/Cs to monitor their use. The internal layout the premises should be generally uncluttered with few places for concealment, allowing staff to monitor customer behaviour. The precise arrangement of internal furnishings should aid circulation and aim to achieve a balance between intimacy and visibility.

4.5 Lighting

- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors/shutters. Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light.
- ☐ Internal lighting should be controlled from behind the bar or in a security/management room, away from public access. Zoned dimmers should be used to increase control of areas from the bar/management office. An override is recommended, within easy reach of security staff, so that if an incident occurs the lighting level can be raised. High-level house lighting is an important element of control. This will also help at the end of an event so that staff can see to clear up, and patrons have no doubt that it is closing time and they should make their way out of the premises.

4.6 Alarm

- ☐ An alarm should be installed to cover the premises, linked to contacts on all external doors/shutters and PIR detectors. It is strongly recommended that any alarm system is monitored, with a response facility (e.g. linked to an Alarm Receiving Centre, who will alert the key holder).
- ☐ It is also recommended that the alarm system should incorporate personal attack buttons for the use of staff in identified locations, such as behind the bars or in any cash office (which should also contain a telephone and a mobile phone with a clear signal).

4.7 CCTV

4.7.1 Any CCTV system that may be used within this proposal will require certain specifications and intelligent placement of cameras to compliment the design of the development. Designers should consider the following points when planning a CCTV strategy:

- ☐ CCTV systems (and lighting that support them) require regular cleaning and maintenance to remain effective.
- ☐ Where necessary cameras that are vulnerable to damage should be protected from attack either by relocation to a higher level and using a bigger lens to achieve the view required or through the fitting of a vandal resistant housing.
- ☐ With regards to the retention of footage, the police prefer quality over quantity. The overall retention period should be dictated by what the system is designed to achieve, though it would be better to have good quality images over a 14-day period than poor ones over a 30-day period.
- ☐ Procedures for recovery of recordings are recommended to be established (e.g. trained staff / the CCTV system instruction manual to be readily available). This is to ensure that the images produced will be of an [acceptable standard](#) that will allow for [identification](#) of an individual which will stand up to scrutiny in court.

Acceptable Standard - this generally requires a resolution of 720x576 pixels at a real time frame rate of 25 frames per second. (N.B. Both the camera and DVR must be capable of this – if the camera will only send low resolution images then it does not matter how high the resolution of the recording unit is).

Identification – One of three levels of field of view. To identify an individual, the image must capture no less than 120% of the field of view (at least from the top of the individuals head to their knees). The remaining two levels of field of view are '[Overview](#)' and '[Recognition](#)', which whilst effective for observational purposes, are less likely to result in the identification of a person/offender.

- ☐ The intelligent placement of cameras helps to provide clear facial identification of individuals. Suitable locations would be: [the external entrances to the premises, all bars and alcohol storage areas, any cash office and customer circulation/seating areas.](#)

5 Management & Maintenance

5.1.1 Active continuous management and maintenance of the premises can reduce the likelihood of crime and disorder occurring. An operating/maintenance plan should be created to promote good management of the premises, this plan should focus on issues such as:

- Opening and closing of premises, including staff arrival and departure;
- Any cash management within the premises;
- Any cash-in-transit collections/deliveries and banking practices (which should take place in a secure room with a certified safe to meet insurance needs);
- Management of stock deliveries (servicing activities should not require any service doors to remain open unattended for prolonged periods);
- Details of staff security training;
- Location and management of any smoking areas;
- Repairing damaged external and internal fittings, particularly security features e.g. alarm system, CCTV cameras etc;
- Cleaning and prompt removal of graffiti, litter etc; and
- Refuse collection arrangements.

5.1.2 There should be regular reviews/exercises to ensure that it remains accurate, workable and up-to-date. All staff should understand and accept the need for security measures and it should be made easy for people to raise concerns or report observations.

- 5.1.3 The opening hours of the premises should be consistent with other such premises in the locale and should not unduly conflict with other nearby uses. Service of drinks should end approximately 30 minutes before the premises closes, in order to aid effective dispersal of customers.
- 5.1.4 All high value equipment (e.g. computers, flat screen monitors/televisions etc.) should be property marked and securely fixed or stored to deter damage/theft. An accurate record should be maintained which logs all such items.
- 5.1.5 It is highly recommended that customer tables are fitted with Chelsea Clips, to reduce the opportunities for theft (see below).



- 5.1.6 Toilets can give rise to problems and the following issues should be considered:
- Fittings should be flush to avoid tampering and concealed cisterns, pipe work etc. should be used.
 - Graffiti and vandal resistant materials, such as stainless steel, laminates and plastics should be considered.
 - Consider hanging cubicle doors as outward opening as this will aid gaining access in an emergency. An alternative measure is to reduce toilet doors in size by a minimum of 200mm from the floor and to reduce the top height.
 - Provide 'Chelsea Clip'/karibina style hooks on the back of cubicle doors or partitions for bags and coats.
 - Consider the safety of vending machines. Cash boxes can be tampered with, consider fitting them with alarms.
 - Consider setting out a rota and putting notices in toilet facilities that make users aware that regular checks will be carried out. A built in visited/checked chart should be provided.
 - Adequate signage should be deployed in all areas not only to direct people throughout the premises, but also to deter unauthorised access to back-of-house/staff-only areas.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
28/01/2019	TQBF Ltd	CIS instruction received
29/01/2019	TQBF Ltd	Fee confirmed
13/02/2019	GMP	Invoice issued
15/02/2019	DfS	Site visit
22/02/2019	DfS	CIS completed

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
1	Proposed-Floor-Plan-Planning.pdf		
2	Accoustic-report-1-Salmon-Street-Manchester.pdf		
3	Premises-Licence-Summary.pdf		
4	Operating-Schedule.doc_11256759_1.pdf		
5	Salmon-Street-Mcr-Ltd-premises-licence.pdf		
6	003_Building-Cross-Section-AA-existing.pdf		
7	Smoking-Policy.doc		
8	Existing-Floor-Plans.pdf		
9	Dispersal-Policy.doc		

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		

D Glossary

Burglary Resistance Standards

BS PAS 23-1, 1999

General performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

A performance standard for door-sets and windows, which certifies that a particular door-set is fit for purpose. Door products must also have BS PAS 24 certification.

BS PAS 24-1, 2012

General security performance requirements for door/window assemblies.

An attack test standard for door-sets and windows. This is the minimum police requirement for Secured by Design dwellings, and is also applicable to French/double doors, and sliding doors.

ENV 1627-30 (Security Ratings WK1 to WK6)

Windows, doors, shutters - Burglar resistance Requirements and classification

The classification system used in ENV 1627-30 is aimed at the commercial market and is based on five elements:

- a) Resistance of glazing
- b) Performance of hardware
- c) Resistance to static loading
- d) Resistance to dynamic loading
- e) Burglary resistance by manual **intervention**

LPS 1175 (Security Ratings 1 to 6)

Specification for testing and classifying the burglary resistance of building components

This includes doors, shutters, garage doors and grilles typically for commercial premises and higher risk domestic premises and is acceptable to the ABI and the Police. The standard has 6 levels, 6 being the highest, with levels 1 and 2 equivalent in many respects to BS PAS 24 and BS 7950.

STS201 Issue 4: 2012

Enhanced security requirements for door-sets and door assemblies for dwellings to satisfy the requirements of PAS23 and PAS24

STS202 Issue 3: 2011

Requirements for burglary resistance of construction products including hinged, pivoted, folding or sliding door-sets, windows, curtain walling, security grilles, garage doors and shutters.

This specifies a broadly similar range of attack tools and times to those specified at the lower levels of LPS1175.

EN 356, 2000 (Ratings P1A to P8A)

Glass in building. Security glazing. Testing and classification of resistance against manual attack.

A performance standard for manual attacks on glazing. P2A is comparable to the performance of a 6.8mm laminated glass, and P4A to that of a 9.5mm laminated glass.

Commonly Used Acronyms

CIT

Cash in transit (refers to vehicles, personnel and routines).

CPTED

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

CRS

Crime Reduction Specialist. Sometimes known as CPO (Crime Prevention Officer)

INPT

Integrated Neighbourhood Policing Team.

PVB/PolyVinyl Butyral (Glazing interlayer)

A commonly used interlayer used in the production of laminated glass.

LPCB (Loss Prevention Certification Board)

A brand of the BRE Global (Building Research Establishment) family. The LPCB work with insurers, Government, police, designers, manufacturers, contractors and end users to develop methods of assessing performance and reliability of security products to ensure their fitness for purpose.

UKAS (United Kingdom Accreditation Service)

The sole national accreditation body recognised by government to assess, against internationally agreed standards, organisations that provide certification, testing, inspections and calibration services.

Useful Websites

Design for Security

www.designforsecurity.org

Secured by Design

www.securedbydesign.com

RIBA Product Selector

www.ribaproductselector.com

LPCB – Red Book Live

www.redbooklive.com

Crime Reduction (Home Office)

www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk

DAC (Design Against Crime) Solution Centre

www.designagainstcrime.org

Building for Life

www.buildingforlife.org

CLG (Communities and Local Government)

www.communities.gov.uk