



CRIME IMPACT STATEMENT

Parrs Wood Lane, Didsbury

75 No. Apartments

FOR: Dandara

Version A: 24th February 2022

REFERENCE: 2013/0807/CIS/01

Greater Manchester Police

designforsecurity

Parrs Wood Lane

2013/0807/CIS/01

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recommendations made

This development has been assessed against the principles of 'Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design' (CPTED - <http://designforsecurity.org/about/crime-prevention-through-environmental-design/>), in order to reduce the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. The following areas have been identified as a concern and should be addressed (see section 3.3 for more details).

- Recessed doorways and areas of the building footprint should be addressed to minimise the risk of criminality or antisocial behaviour.
- Access into the parking area should be restricted with a security rate high speed roller shutter.
- Access control and physical security of the buildings should be carefully considered.

Additionally, there are a number of recommendations made in section 3.3 of this report which would enhance the security of the development, and it is highly recommended that these are considered. It is also recommended that the development is built to Secured by Design standards.



Patrick Babb

Consultant

e: patrick.babb@designforsecurity.org

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1 Visual Audit

The proposed development site can be seen on the adjacent map, edged in red. The site is located in the area of Didsbury, within the city of Manchester.

The development plot is roughly triangular and the land is presently part of the car park for the Tesco store to the North of the site.

The site boundaries are defined by the Tesco car park to the North, to the South-East by Parrs Wood Lane, and to the South-West by the access road into the Tesco store/car park.

The local area is a mix of commercial uses, office space, and residential properties. The majority of the homes in the local area are typically semi-detached houses, with a mix of other housing types.



2 Crime Statistics & Analysis

All data below is based on crimes recorded between 1st December 2020 and 30th November 2021.

2.1 Crime Summary

Recorded Crime within 500m of Site									
Domestic Burglary	Non-Domestic Burglary	Criminal Damage	Less Serious Wounding	Theft	Robbery	Serious Wounding	Theft from Motor Vehicle	Theft of Motor Vehicle	Bicycle Theft
27	<5	25	110	28	13	<5	47	13	24

- 2.1.1 The overall rate of crime in the local area is 21% below the average rate of crime for the Manchester District, with less serious wounding, theft and vehicle crime being the highest recorded offences taking place.
- 2.1.2 Less serious woundings have occurred throughout the local area around Parrs Wood Road and Wilmslow Road to the east of the proposed site. The areas in which an increase of offences have been experienced are around the Metrolink stop, the local high school and Parrswood Complex, which houses, restaurants and entertainment units. Public order offences and harassment offences have been the highest recorded less serious woundings taking place. Offenders are often known to the victim, with incidents between known associates and domestic disputes most commonly reported.
- 2.1.3 Theft in the area is high, however; offences are concentrated around the Parrswood Complex and the local petrol station and supermarket. Offenders have made off without payment at the fuelling station. Offences occurring around the complex have mostly been offenders removing insecure bags/ mobile phones from tables, backs of chairs and under the tables.
- 2.1.4 Vehicle crime has taken place throughout the local area, particularly around the car park surrounding the complex and Metrolink stop. Offenders have smashed glazing in order to gain access to the vehicle as well as using tools in order to remove vehicle registration plates.

2.2 Common Local M.O.s (Modus Operandi)

- 2.2.1 Forcing open secure doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to apartments
Possible Solution - All apartment entrance doorsets should be certified to a burglary resistant standard (i.e. BS PAS 24).
- 2.2.2 Entering apartment buildings by means of insecure doors/ tailgating residents and gaining access to communal areas.
Possible Solution - There should be access controlled secure doorsets restricting access to the circulation core of the building to reduce the possibility of would-be offenders from tailgating residents and visitors into the building.
- 2.2.3 Exploitation of insecure windows and doors to gain access into communal areas and apartments
Possible Solution – All ground floor communal doors should be fitted with door closers and lock automatically, to prevent these doors from being left open and insecure. Any publically accessible apartment entrance doors should be fitted with a split-spindle, or fixed external handle, to prevent them from being opened from the outside when unlocked. Any accessible windows should be restricted in opening to prevent them from being fully opened if left insecure.
- 2.2.4 Forcing open secure shutters using bodily pressure and implements in order to access the doors/windows behind
Possible Solution - Any shutters should conform to a recognised security standard such as LPS 1175 SR 2.





2.3 Risk Factors

The typical security risks for a development of this nature are:

- Domestic burglary
- Theft from gardens, sheds or garages
- Criminal damage to dwellings and vehicles
- Theft of, or from, vehicles
- Bogus callers and distraction burglary
- Anti-social behaviour
- Neighbour disputes
- Theft and criminal damage during the construction period
- Unauthorised access to private spaces
- Poor maintenance of access control systems

2.4 Crime Rate Comparison

The rates below relates to crime committed within 500m of the site. England & Wales data was last recorded for January – December 2020.



- 2.4.1 The rate of domestic burglaries per 1000 dwellings is **28% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **25% higher** than Greater Manchester and **79% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.2 The rate of woundings per 1000 dwellings is **5% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **49% higher** than Greater Manchester and **59% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.3 The rate of incidents of criminal damage per 1000 dwellings is **52% lower** than Manchester as a whole, **31% lower** than Greater Manchester and **3% higher** than England & Wales.
- 2.4.4 The rate of incidents of vehicle crime per 1000 dwellings is **3% higher** than Manchester as a whole, **86% higher** than Greater Manchester and **225% higher** than England & Wales.

2.5 Domestic Burglary: Risk Analysis



The data below relates to domestic burglaries committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.5.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of domestic burglary peaks on a Wednesday and Thursday during the early hours of the morning. Offenders often target properties in the early hours of the morning when it is dark and there is less footfall in the area, giving offenders the perception that they are less likely to be caught or identified.
- 2.5.2 **Point of Entry:** In the local area the following entry points and MO's have been utilised most frequently:
- Forcing open secure windows and doors using bodily pressure and implements in order to gain access to the property.
 - Exploitation of insecure windows and doors.
 - Smashed glazing in windows and doors.
 - Entering the rear garden of the property and using bodily pressure and implements gain access to the garden shed.

2.6 Vehicle Crime: Risk Analysis

The data below relates to vehicle crime committed within 500m of the site.



- 2.6.1 **Day/Time Range:** The risk of vehicle crime peaks on a Tuesday and Thursday during the early hours of the morning (1am – 3:30am). Offenders often target vehicles during the early hours of the morning as vehicles are often left unattended for long periods of time, often out of the owners sight, creating a perceived low risk opportunity.

3 Layout Appraisal

3.1 Proposed development

- 3.1.1 The proposed development is an apartment building with 75 no. apartments and a ground floor unit for flexible community use. There will be undercroft parking at ground floor level and a large bicycle store for residents inside the building.

3.2 Positive Aspects of the Proposal

The following proposed features would make a positive contribution to the prevention of crime and fear of crime.

- 3.2.1 The main communal entrance is in a prominent location where it can easily be seen by residents and visitors from the road on approach, and subject to passive surveillance from those passing by on foot and in vehicles. The Tesco car park to the rear of the building is well used, particularly by those on foot, and this will allow passive surveillance to the rear of the building.
- 3.2.2 The proposed apartments will increase residential activity in this area. There are a number of residential developments in the area and these will potentially benefit from the increase of residential activity which can deter criminality and antisocial behaviour - if would be offenders believe they will be seen or identified by the public.
- 3.2.3 The proposed ground floor commercial units will generate additional activity in the area at different times of the day, deterring offenders or those antisocially minded from targeting the apartment development. The ground floor community use will provide an active frontage allowing surveillance of the surrounding areas from inside the building.
- 3.2.4 All apartments are above street level, reducing the potential impacts of excessive noise, nuisance, and anti-social behaviour.
- 3.2.5 There will be bicycle parking within the building allowing residents to store their bicycles securely.
- 3.2.6 There will be a secure undercroft car parking area for residents.
- 3.2.7 There will be a defensible space buffer between the public footway and the external doors of the ground floor apartments.

3.3 Changes Needed and Recommendations

The following points have been identified for further consideration and would need to be addressed for Design for Security to support the proposed scheme.

- 3.3.1 The recessed escape door adjacent the commercial sprinkler tank room could potentially conceal an offender from view, allowing them to target this door without being seen; this area could also generate antisocial behaviour to the detriment of residents (i.e. alcohol/drug consumption, loitering and vagrancy). It is highly recommended that this recess is omitted or reduced in depth to 600mm.
- 3.3.2 The small recessed area to the rear of the building adjacent the car park entrance could potentially conceal an offender or someone antisocially minded, from view. It is recommended that this recess is omitted or access is restricted (i.e. with dense planting).
- 3.3.3 The rear entrance into the building should be illuminated to a high standard to deter loitering.
- 3.3.4 Access into the ground floor unit for community use should be restricted to authorised users. It is highly recommended that any access control system is auditable and that the unit is fitted with an alarm system.
- 3.3.5 External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing, and secured with a multi-point electronic lock operating with an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification.
- 3.3.6 Access in to the building should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access in to the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access in to the building.
- 3.3.7 There should be two access control door sets restricting access into the circulation core of the building (i.e. the main communal entrance and the door into the lift lobby).
- 3.3.8 Doors into cycle stores should operate on an access control system, operated with resident's key card/fob. Access into cycle stores should be restricted to genuine users rather than all residents. Bicycle racks should allow both wheels and the frame of a bicycle to be secured.
- 3.3.9 Building elevations should be illuminated at street level to reduce the potential for congregating and to facilitate safe travel around the building perimeter. Landscaped areas and pedestrian routes through the site should be illuminated to a high standard (i.e. in accordance with BS 5489) to deter those criminally or antisocially minded, and to reduce fear of crime.
- 3.3.10 Access to the parking area should be restricted with a high speed, security rated, shutter, reducing the potential for tailgating. The car parking area should be illuminated to a high standard. Onward access into the building from the car parking area should be restricted with access control and security rated doors sets.

4 Physical Security

The following checklist forms the physical security requirements for this scheme to achieve Secured by Design accreditation.

4.1 Doors



External communal access doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system. The communal entrance doors should be self-closing and secured with a multi-point electronic lock and capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, these features should be permitted under the scope of the certification. Access in to the build should be controlled by a video entry phone system (with the picture viewable on the phone unit, rather than on a television set) so that residents can vet visitors before allowing them access in to the building. There should be no unrestricted trade access in to the building.

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- ☐ Where secure postal lobbies are to be created, the secondary communal door must be to the same specification as the outer door - certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system.
 - ☐ Apartment entrance doors must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24, STS201, or LPS 1175 SR2. Apartment entrance doors must have a door viewer.
 - ☐ External apartment entrance doors should be capable of being opened externally without a key. These doors should have a fixed external handle or a split-spindle.
 - ☐ External escape-only doors (as with external doors in general) should be certified to BS PAS 24, or LPS 1175 SR2. It is crucial that the door ironmongery is permitted for use on these doors under the security certification of the product.

4.2 Windows

- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible windows must be compliant with and certified to BS PAS 24.
- ☐ Ground floor and easily accessible opening lights (escape requirements permitting) must be key-lockable, and have fixed/lockable opening restrictors (not releasable from the outside) limited to 100mm.

4.3 Glazing & Building Fabric

- ☐ Glazing to a height of 2400mm (or if otherwise accessible) must incorporate at least one pane of glass with a 1.5mm PVB interlayer (e.g. 7.5mm laminated glass), or a glass rated as P4A under EN 356. The remaining pane in a double glazed unit may be toughened glass.
- ☐ Any curtain walling panels should include laminated glazing and should be securely fixed directly to the floor slabs where possible, rather than to perimeter columns.
- ☐ There should be a block work wall or material of similar strength (e.g. welded-steel mesh) behind or within any new cladding/insulated panels to the building, to a minimum height of 2000mm from ground level, to ensure that the fabric of the building itself is not vulnerable to attack.

4.4 Alarms

- ☐ If an alarm is installed then it should comply with either:
 - BS EN 50131 and PD 6662 for wired systems
 - BS 6799 for wireless systems
- ☐ If an alarm is not to be provided, there should be a 13amp, non-switched fuse spur to allow future residents to connect an alarm.
- ☐ An alarm should be installed to the ground floor community-use unit.

4.5 Access Control

- ☐ Access control systems should be operable by swipe card or fob, and not numeric key pads. The following areas/doors should operate on access control:
 - Communal entrances
 - Communal areas
 - Bicycle stores
 - Car parking area
 - Community unit

- Circulation cores
- Staff only areas

4.6 Bicycle Parking

- ☐ Doors in to the cycle parking area(s) must be certified to BS PAS 24, STS202, or LPS 1175 SR2, including a lock capable of being operated via an electronic access control system, with access restricted to registered residents (i.e. genuine bicycle owners)..
- ☐ Cycle stands should either be U-profile or Sheffield style stands. If rack storage is used it should be possible for both wheels and the frame to be secured.

4.7 Car Parking

- ☐ Access into the car parking area should be restricted with a high speed, security rated, shutter.
- ☐ The car parking area should be illuminated to a high standard in accordance with BS 5489.

4.8 Landscaping

- ☐ There should be no hard landscaping that could inadvertently create seating or loitering spots (except within secure designated or otherwise-controlled areas). These features can encourage anti-social behaviour and raise the fear of crime.
- ☐ It is essential that good sightlines are maintained throughout the development to allow residents and visitors to actively survey the area for potential threats and planting should be carefully considered particularly near the building entrance.

4.9 Lighting

- ☐ External lighting must be provided to pedestrian routes within the development in accordance with BS 5489. Lighting should be taken from a variety of sources and levels (i.e. columns, up lighting) to provide a greater level of coverage and avoid shadows/pooling.
- ☐ Fittings should produce 'white' light, as opposed to yellow/orange light. Metal halide (or bulbs with a comparable output) should be used, as these offer superior colour rendition over alternatives such as high and low pressure sodium bulbs.
- ☐ Dusk 'til dawn lights, operated by photoelectric cell/daylight sensor, should be installed to all external doors.
- ☐ Doors within the parking area should be illuminated with a dedicated lighting source.
- ☐ Elevations of the building should be illuminated.

5 Management & Maintenance

- 5.1.1 The upkeep of a development over its lifetime can be crucial to the level of security and safety within. Aspects of a development, which are left to deteriorate, have the potential to attract further crime – a process known as 'the broken window theory'. A maintenance plan should be drawn up to address issues such as:
- Litter removal
 - Repair to communal areas (lighting, signage, access controls)
 - Trimming and pruning to shrubs and trees

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- 5.1.2 Any public open space or amenity areas not under the ownership of residents should be subject to an effective maintenance contract. This should ensure that all damage is rectified in a timely manner, and that any such space will not be detrimental to its surroundings.

6 Construction

- 6.1.1 Untidy sites and their surroundings can be littered with debris accessible to vandals who often use loose materials as missiles to commit crime. The client should take measures appropriate to secure their site during construction, and control pedestrian and vehicular access in to and out of the site curtilage. It is also recommended that the contractor on this scheme is a member of the 'Considerate Constructors Scheme', who has committed to be a considerate and good neighbour, as well as clean, respectful, safe, environmentally conscious, responsible and accountable.
- 6.1.2 Site security contractors should be SIA (Security Industry Authority) approved to ensure professional standards are adhered to (please see <http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/acs-intro.aspx> for more details).

7 Useful References

7.1 Secured by Design (SBD)

- 7.1.1 Secured by Design focuses on crime prevention at the design, layout and construction stages of homes and commercial premises and promotes the use of security standards for a wide range of applications and products. To apply for Secured by Design certification for your development, visit our online application form at: <http://www.designforsecurity.org/secured-by-design/sbd-accreditation/>

A Contact register

Date	Contact With	Summary of Contact
25/11/2021	Cerys Hulbert	CIS application received
01/02/2022	Cerys Hulbert	Updated plans received

B Associated Documents

This report is based on the following drawings and supplementary information submitted by the applicant.

Drawing No.	Drawing Title	Date	Rev
L(--)000	Ground Floor Plan	Nov 21	E
L(--)00R	Roof Plan	Nov 21	B
L(--)001	First Floor Plan	Nov 21	E
L(--)002	Typical Floor Plan	Nov 21	E
L(--)005	Fifth Floor Plan	Nov 21	D
L(--)210	North Elevation	Sept 21	D
L(--)211	East Elevation	Sept 21	D
L(--)212	South Elevation	Sept 21	D
L(--)213	West Elevation	Sept 21	E
L(--)901	Site Location Plan	Sept 21	A

PLEASE NOTE - In the event of any subsequent material changes to the scheme, it will be necessary for Design for Security to reassess the comments made within this report.

C CIS Version History

Version	Revisions Made	Date
A		